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Abstract
Information Systems (IS) managers need to optimize and balance multiple objectives, man-
age resources, prioritize projects, enforce alignment with business goals, etc. while making
IT investment decisions. These decisions are not made in isolation but must be part of a
coherent plan in order to achieve the organization’s IT goals. Effective planning involves
correctly identifying the organizational IS needs and finding efficient mechanisms to fulfill
them; these can be understood as identifying IS “ends” and “means” respectively.
In this dissertation, we make new contributions to both of these aspects of planning:
When determining an organization’s goal or “ends”, we demonstrate the importance of
considering rarity of IT capabilities in evaluating the goal. More fundamentally, we describe a
framework to model the IS planning process of an organization as a Markov Decision Process:
this mathematical formalism allows us to elegantly capture several important features of the
planning process that have been described in the literature. With an effective model of
the planning process (the “means” of planning), we can then study the impact of various
planning dimensions on plan effectiveness. We focus on two primary dimensions: first, the
length of the IT planning horizon and second, whether and how an organization engages
in double-loop learning to reconcile discrepancies between its espoused objective and its
objective in use. We show that the impact of these dimensions on plan effectiveness varies
by organizational strategy type.
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Information Systems (IS) management involves managing the IT investments of an organi-
zation. IS managers need to optimize and balance multiple objectives, manage resources,
prioritize projects, and align with business goals while making IT investment decisions.
These decisions are not made in isolation but must be part of a coherent plan in order to
achieve the organization’s IT goals. Thus, Information Systems planning is a key responsibil-
ity of IT leaders, and the plans they develop form the framework for subsequent investment
decisions. In this dissertation, we study organizational IS planning and the various factors
that influence the effectiveness of these plans.
Information Systems planning involves correctly identifying the organizational IT needs
(that is, the desired goal) and finding efficient mechanisms to fulfill them. These can be
understood as the organization’s “ends” and “means” respectively, and both have been
identified in the literature as crucial for effective planning: For instance, Premkumar and
King (1994) conclude that “the two planning dimensions respectively reflecting the ‘means’
and ‘ends’ of IS planning are equally important” in determining the quality and effectiveness
of the IS planning process. Thus, we operationalize IS planning in the following framework:
First, an organization must understand its current IT state. Second, it must identify a de-
sired future state (the “end”), and the gap between the current and future states. Finally, it
must find a path (the “means”) to move from its current state to the desired state. In fact,
practitioners have also advocated using similar approaches, such as the Enterprise Archi-
tecture framework (Ross et al., 2006; Burton and Robertson, 2008). Effective Information
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Systems planning, then, involves identifying both the best (or highest-value) achievable fu-
ture state of the organization, and finding the most efficient (best, quickest, or lowest-cost)
path to achieve this state.
The following figure illustrates the effect of means and ends on effective planning, and
our contributions to both of these planning dimensions.
Figure 1.1: Research Contribution to both “Means” and “Ends” of IS Planning
We first consider the aspect of identifying the goal state. How should organizations
choose their goals? Lederer and Sethi (1988) state that Strategic Information Systems Plan-
ning involves the choosing of applications that have a high impact and ability to create an
advantage over competitors. Ramanujam and Venkatraman (1987), supporting the earlier
work of Henry (1979) claim that “there are strong arguments that the ultimate test of the
planning system’s effectiveness and justification for its existence is the impact on organiza-
tional performance.” Similarly, Segars and Grover (1998) identify short-term performance
and long-term performance as among the most important goals for planning.
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Prior literature has considered various factors affecting performance, such as strategic
alignment, NPV, etc. Our contribution in this area is the identification of a new metric, rarity
of IT capabilities. We propose the consideration of rarity of IT resources during planning or
in the choice of organizational goals because we demonstrate that the possession of rare IT
resources has an effect on firm performance. The Resource-Based View (RBV) theoretical
framework emphasizes that a key contributor to a firm’s performance is the set of resources
it possesses, acquires or develops e.g. Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1986, 1991;
Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Makadok, 2001; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984; Newbert, 2007,
2008). This theory has also been extended to Information Systems / Information Technology
(IS/IT)-specific resources (Aral and Weill, 2007; Bharadwaj, 2000; Powell and Dent-Micallef,
1997; Tippins and Sohi, 2003; Wade and Hulland, 2004). Rarity has particularly important
implications with respect to technology (IT) resources, because they enable firms to develop
sustainable and inimitable capabilities, in contrast to common IT resources that are widely-
possessed as commodities (Mata et al., 1995).
Chapter 2 of the dissertation describes our analysis and findings related to rarity, which
we briefly summarize below. We collect data from a text corpus from Dow Jones & Com-
pany’s Factiva database of 81,264 press releases that describe inter-firm partnerships of 64
organizations spanning a period of 11 years. We use this corpus to estimate the rarity of 488
technology-related keywords using an inverse document frequency (IDF) analysis. This mea-
sure of rarity is validated by examining search volumes (from Google Trends) to measure the
correlation between the frequency of keywords in our corpus and the frequency of Internet
searches for the same keywords; the correlation is statistically significant, suggesting that
IDF is an effective proxy for the rarity of each of these 488 IT resources. We measure each
firm’s possession of rare IT resources in each year by computing a term-frequency / inverse
document frequency (TF - IDF) score. We classify these IT resources into five classes - infras-
tructure, connectivity, systems/data, information management and sourcing. Our analysis
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shows that the possession of rare technological resources is associated with the formation
of inter-firm arm’s length alliances and joint ventures. The possession of rare (and likely
dissimilar) infrastructure technologies has a negative effect on the formation of alliances and
joint ventures, perhaps because this makes it more difficult for firms to share information or
collaborate. The possession of rare sourcing technologies (indicating firms with more expe-
rience in outsourcing) is also indicative of fewer alliances. However, the possession of rare
systems and data technologies has a positive effect on the formation of alliances, perhaps
because this gives firms access to sophisticated tools and data that might enable value-
creating activities. Similarly, the possession of rare information management technologies
is positively and significantly associated with alliance formation. We also observe that the
possession of rare technological resources affects the choice of governance system in alliances
formed by an organization; organizations possessing more rare technologies tend to have a
smaller fraction of their alliances as joint ventures (compared to organizations with fewer
rare technologies). Joint ventures are associated with more information sharing, and hence
firms with rare technologies may avoid joint ventures due to concerns about information
leakage to their alliance partners; arm’s length alliances reduce the risk of such leakage.
Finally, we show that the possession of rare technologies has an impact on firm per-
formance (measured using Tobin’s q). Therefore, IS leaders should consider rarity of IT
resources during the evaluation of a future goal state.
Once an organization has identified valuable goals or future states, how do (or should)
they go about finding paths to achieve one of them? In Chapter 3, we model this part of the
planning process using Markov Decision Processes. Markov Decision Processes have several
components: A set of states, one of which is marked as a start state, and one or more of
which are final states; a set of actions, and a set of transition rules. We define a state as a set
of IT capabilities; the start state (current organization state) is the set of IT capabilities that
the organization possesses at the start of the planning process. The final state corresponds
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to the set of IT capabilities desired by the organization in the future. We define an action
as the set of IT investments that an organization makes in order to move from one state to
the next. The transition rules determines which new state the organization will be in when
it makes an IT investment in its current state. Permitting non-deterministic (or stochastic)
transition rules is a key feature of Markov Decision Processes; a stochastic or probabilistic
transition rule reflects the uncertainty of outcomes of an IT investment. We also assume
that every transition has a cost associated with it. The cost of building a capability from
one state by making an IT investment could be different from the cost of building the same
capability from a different state by investing in similar (or even the same) projects.
Thus, a method for an organization to achieve an IT goal can be simply understood as
a path from the start state to the desired final state; more formally, this path is a series
or sequence of transitions between the start state, several intermediate states, and the final
state. The cost of a path is defined as the sum of the costs of the transitions on it and the
most efficient path is the path with the least cost. ‘Cost’ can be defined in multiple ways;
it could be a monetary cost, resource cost, time required, or opportunity cost. Thus, the
second aspect of effective IT planning involves finding the most efficient or effective path to
reach a valuable goal state.
Why are Markov Decision Processes good models for IS planning? They are highly effec-
tive mathematical formalisms that can easily capture several issues that arise in planning.
For instance, one of the challenges in Information Systems planning is uncertainty, as orga-
nizations may plan several years into the future; probabilistic transition rules can naturally
capture the uncertain outcomes of IT investments. Grover and Segars (2005) have described
the importance of the process dimensions of information systems planning, and many of
these can be easily captured by Markov Decision Processes; for example, comprehensiveness
has been long understood as an important feature of planning in the strategic management
literature (Fredrickson, 1984, 1986; Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984). Comprehensiveness
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involves thorough examination of a wide range of alternatives, and evaluating their con-
sequences; Markov Decision Processes allow one to very efficiently identify the ‘best’ path
among a possibly exponential number of alternative paths to a goal. Surveying a full range
of objectives is another important process dimension, and Markov Decision Processes allow
identifying an efficient frontier of paths that collectively optimize multiple objectives.
With Markov Decision Processes as an effective model of the IT planning process, we
can investigate the consequences of various planning choices and dimensions. By modifying
various parameters of the planning process, we may obtain different plans, corresponding
to different paths. By measuring the cost or effectiveness for each path that is found, we
can understand the impact of these planning dimensions on plan effectiveness or planning
outcomes.
We examine the effect of two parameters on the planning outcome. These are:
1. Length of IT planning horizon (in Chapter 3)
2. Organizational learning (in Chapter 4).
We continue Chapter 3 by studying the effect of the length of planning horizon on plan
effectiveness. We separately consider two types of organizations: Prospectors and Defenders
(Miles and Snow, 1978). Defenders operate in a stable environment and rarely make major
adjustments in their technology (Sabherwal and Chan, 2001). Prospectors on the other hand,
seek to be the first to innovate in their industry, operating in a more dynamic environment.
Operating in dynamic environments, however, can result in high uncertainty; in fact, Newkirk
and Lederer (2006) identify dynamism as the leading factor in uncertainty. We show that
uncertainty has an impact on the effectiveness of different planning horizons; as uncertainty
increases, shorter planning horizons tend to lead to more effective plans. In general, when
uncertainty is low, it is helpful to make long-term plans to ensure that short-sighted decisions
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in the current state do not lead to high costs later on. On the other hand, when uncertainty
is high, it may not be wise to pass on advantageous short-term opportunities with the aim
of reaping long-term benefits that may never materialize.
In Chapter 4, we move on to consider the importance of learning for plan effectiveness. We
build on prior theoretical work that considers learning as an important feature of planning
systems, and as a key dimension in measuring the effectiveness of Information Systems
Planning (Shrivastava and Grant, 1985; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1987; Henderson and
Sifonis, 1988; Grover and Segars, 2005). We define learning as inference or understanding of
a problem, followed by action to improve effectiveness. We first argue that organizations do
learn in this manner, and hence any good model of the planning process must capture this
important dimension of planning.
To demonstrate that organizations learn, we use real data on IT project / performance
collected from a Fortune 50 company in the financial services sector; the data obtained
describes various attributes of the projects such as estimated resource costs, work hours
required, initiative structure, coordination complexity, and many more, as well as perfor-
mance data describing whether the project is over budget, behind schedule, and matches
the proposed scope. We show that there are consistent patterns in this data of factors or
attributes that lead to project under-performance; this enables the inference or identification
of a problem which is a key component of learning. Over time, these patterns change, and
projects with these attributes do not perform as badly; this suggests that the organizations
have learned about the pattern, and taken steps to increase their effectiveness.
Our main focus in this chapter, though, is double-loop learning (Argyris, 1976; Argyris
and Scho¨n, 1978), and a key contribution that we make is extending double-loop learning
to the Information Systems planning context. IS leaders at an organization may make
planning decisions using an objective that is different from the objective espoused by the
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organization, and choosing goals based on this different objective. Double-loop learning
involves recognizing this discrepancy, questioning the chosen goal in light of the ‘true’ or
espoused objective, and making changes so a new goal is chosen which is aligned with the
espoused objective. Again, we consider the organization strategy typology of Miles and Snow
(1978), and argue that Defenders, being risk-averse, are likely to have an espoused objective
of risk-adjusted return, while Prospectors, being risk-neutral or risk-taking, are not likely
to discount for risk. However, IT leaders at these organizations may use their personal
tolerance for risk to make planning decisions, which may differ from the espoused tolerance
of the organization; agency theory (Berle and Means, 1932; Eisenhardt, 1989; Arrow, 1985)
suggests that managers’ incentives may be one reason for this discrepancy. Double-loop
learning may involve identifying this discrepancy, and choosing a new goal based on the
organization’s espoused objective.
We argue that when making IS planning decisions, firms which use an objective that
is different from the objective they espouse may benefit from double-loop learning. We
theoretically analyze how this benefit may be affected by factors such as the correlation
between IT project risks and returns, and the time of learning, and then validate this theory




the Importance of Rarity
2.1 Introduction
Firms constantly seek more and better resources in order to gain an advantage over their
competitors. The firm’s ability to acquire, develop and deploy resources is the basis for the
resource-based view (RBV), which has spawned an immense stream of literature suggesting
that performance is a function of a firm’s unique set of resources (e.g. Amit and Schoemaker,
1993; Barney, 1986, 1991; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Makadok, 2001; Peteraf, 1993; Werner-
felt, 1984; Newbert, 2007, 2008). According to the resource-based view, resources which are
valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable provide a firm with sustained competitive
advantage (Barney, 1991). This approach has been applied to Information Systems / In-
formation Technology (IS/IT)-specific resources as well (Aral and Weill, 2007; Bharadwaj,
2000; Powell and Dent-Micallef, 1997; Tippins and Sohi, 2003; Wade and Hulland, 2004).
We are interested in examining the effect of rare IT resources on firm performance.
However, organizations may not have all the resources they need. Alliances provide a
means for companies to obtain access to resources that they may not possess themselves, but
which may be possessed by alliance partners (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Hamel,
1991; Mowery et al., 1996). Gulati defines alliances as “voluntary arrangements between
firms involving exchange, sharing, or co-development of products, technologies, or services”
(1998, p. 293). Alliances also allow firms to gain access to new technologies and share risks,
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especially when they enter new markets. Through the process of forming alliances, firms are
able to shorten innovation cycles. Large firms often form alliances with smaller firms which
specialize in innovative technologies (Alvarez and Barney, 2001). This allows the larger firm
to integrate such technologies into their suite of products, and gives the smaller firm access to
the larger firm’s customer base and distribution network. For example, Apple partnered with
Nuance Technologies, a holder of rare voice recognition technology in a market with a small
number of players. Apple licensed Nuance’s rare technology to be used in the mobile app
called Siri, a major feature of the Apple operating system beginning with the iPhone 4S. This
alliance provides Apple with access to a rare technology and Nuance with access to the vast
Apple user base and the accompanying applications that can use Nuance’s complementary
technology.
These examples highlight the importance of understanding the role of rarity of technology
resources in the formation of alliances and subsequent firm performance. Further, rarity
has particularly important implications with respect to technology (IT) resources, because
they enable firms to develop sustainable and inimitable capabilities, in contrast to common
IT resources that are widely-possessed as commodities (Mata et al., 1995). Therefore, we
examine the effect of the rarity of a firm’s own technology resources on the formation of
alliances and its performance. We also consider how rarity of IT resources may encourage
greater formation of joint ventures rather than arm’s length alliances. This has important
implications for the relationship between IT capabilities, firm strategy, and firm performance.
Our research complements and extends the existing literature by making three main
contributions: 1) consideration of an important type of firm specific resource – technology,
or IT, resources; 2) an empirical assessment of the influence of the rarity of technology




This empirical study considers the effect of rare technology resources on the formation of al-
liances between firms, the types of governance mechanisms of such alliances and whether the
existence of rare technologies may influence the ultimate performance of firms participating
in alliances.
Our analysis focuses specifically on information technology (IT) resources. IT resources
are broadly defined as information technology and information systems across a wide range of
applications such as point-of-sale, production and manufacturing, administration, sales and
marketing, e-mail, communication and e-commerce (Powell and Dent-Micallef, 1997). Our
focus on IT resources has important conceptual similarities as well as notable differences from
R&D-related technology resources as described in prior literature (Villalonga and McGahan,
2005).
2.2.1 Impact of Technology Resources on Alliance Formation
and Performance
While there is significant empirical research that links resources to firm performance e.g.
(Somaya et al., 2007; Thornhill and Amit, 2003), there is a dearth of empirical work that
considers the impact of the resource attributes such as rarity on performance (Newbert,
2007). Studies in the IT context likewise generally consider the impact of resource het-
erogeneity, not resource attributes, on firm performance (Aral and Weill, 2007; Bharadwaj,
2000; Powell and Dent-Micallef, 1997; Tippins and Sohi, 2003; Wade and Hulland, 2004).
Our study differs from prior research in this respect by considering the influence of the
attribute of rarity on alliance formation and performance.
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The basic notion of the resource-based view is that a resource that is valuable and rare
may provide a firm with competitive advantage, while inimitability and non-substitutability
may provide a firm with sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). We focus on
the effects of rare resources on competitive advantage, taking an approach similar to New-
bert (2008). In his empirical work, Newbert (2008) shows that the more rare the resource
combination a firm exploits, the greater its competitive advantage.
A rare resource is possessed by a small subset of competitors and allows a firm to pursue
strategies that other firms may not be able to pursue (Barney, 1991). If most firms have
access to the same resources, the resource is not rare and affords no competitive advantage
for a given firm (Barney, 1991). A resource that is scarce in supply and has no strategically
equivalent substitutes is considered rare (Peteraf, 1993).
Considerable prior research has demonstrated that firms which invest in IT resources
have better performance (Aral and Weill, 2007; Bharadwaj, 2000; Powell and Dent-Micallef,
1997; Tippins and Sohi, 2003; Wade and Hulland, 2004), measured on profits and costs
(Bharadwaj et al., 1999), or by total revenue growth (Mithas et al., 2012). IT resources have
been shown to improve firm performance via the enablement of business processes such as
improved customer service (Ray et al., 2005). Further, acquisition of technology innovations
leads to organizational performance, especially when those innovations are valuable, rare
and inimitable (Irwin et al., 1998).
2.2.2 Strategic Alliances
Firms may utilize their own internal technological resources or seek external technological
resources through acquisitions and alliances. Villalonga and McGahan (2005) find that a
firm’s investment in technological (R&D) resources is associated with its choice of acquisi-
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tions over alliances and alliances over divestitures. We seek to further investigate the role
of Information Technology (IT) resources in governance type, following recent studies in
the context of alliances. For example, IT flexibility (open-communications, cross-functional
transparency and modularity) influences alliance governance type (arm’s-length, collabora-
tive, or joint-venture alliances) and ultimately firm performance (Tafti et al., 2013).
Gulati et al. (2000) find that the network of alliances in which a firm is embedded influ-
ences access to inimitable and non-substitutable resources, which impacts firm performance.
Access to network resources such as technology network resources, marketing network re-
sources, financial network resources, human network resources and network prominence all
influence firm performance (Lavie, 2006). Dyer and Singh (1998) argue that increased prof-
its and returns flow to partnerships when they combine rare and complementary resources,
invest in relation-specific assets, exchange knowledge, and have effective governance mecha-
nisms. Rai et al. (2012) study how IT capabilities help firms in a partnership create relational
value through managing the information, physical and financial flows. Lastly, the IT capa-
bilities (IT integration and IT reconfiguration) and process capabilities (process alignment,
partnering flexibility, and offering flexibility) work as complements to help manage portfo-
lios of inter-organizational relationships (Rai and Tang, 2010) . Building on prior work, we
expect that IT capabilities will impact the ability of an alliance partnership to create value.
Alliances can be classified as arm’s length or collaborative alliances; alternatively can
also be classified on their equity basis as equity joint ventures or non-equity alliances. In
this paper, we consider both arm’s length alliances and joint ventures. Following the work
of Inkpen and Currall (2004) and Gulati and Singh (1998), we adopt the definition of Arm’s
Length alliances as those partnerships among firms in which the “firms agree to provide, sell
or exchange a service or product” and joint ventures as those which “involve the allocation of
partner resources to create an entirely new business entity [and] involve bilateral investments
in technology and firm-specific assets” (Tafti et al., 2013, p. 208).
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2.3 Hypotheses
First, we explore the relationship between firms’ possession of rare IT resources and alliance
formation. To better understand choice of governance within alliances, we further examine
the relationship between rarity of technology resources and joint-ventures, which represent a
specific alliance type. Finally, we consider the impact of firms’ possession of rare IT resources
on their performance post alliances formation.
The resource-based view (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1986, 1991; Dierickx and
Cool, 1989; Makadok, 2001; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984; Newbert, 2007, 2008) explains
how firm performance can be attributed to the possession of firm-specific resources that
are valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable. This theory suggests that a resource
that is valuable and rare may provide a firm with competitive advantage, while inimitability
and non-substitutability may provide a firm with sustained competitive advantage (Barney,
1991). In this paper, we focus on rarity of resources; Peteraf (1993) defines a rare resource as
one that is scarce in supply and has no strategically equivalent substitutes. Barney (1991)
argues that rarity is significant because a firm possessing a rare resource which enables it to
implement a strategy that is not being implemented by others will have a competitive ad-
vantage. Newbert (2008) shows that the more rare the resource combination a firm exploits,
the greater its competitive advantage.
Among firm-specific resources, IT resources are of growing importance. As observed by
Mithas et al. (2011), US firms allocate a significant amount of their capital investments to
IT (higher than R&D investments, for example). Prior work has shown that investing in IT
resources leads to improved firm performance (Aral and Weill, 2007; Bharadwaj, 2000; Powell
and Dent-Micallef, 1997; Tippins and Sohi, 2003; Wade and Hulland, 2004). Bharadwaj
et al. (1999) found that firms with the strongest IT capabilities perform better on both
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profit and cost ratios. Mithas et al. (2012) showed that IT investment has a positive impact
on firm profitability, most notably via revenue growth as opposed to cost efficiency. Thus,
it is important to understand which IT resource attributes affect firm performance, and
how firms acquire such resources. As discussed above, we focus on rarity of IT resources,
extending prior work on the importance of rarity for competitive advantage to the IT setting.
Complementary (in the sense of dissimilar) resources may enable firms to gain competitive
advantage, especially when the resources are rare. Indeed, Oxley and Sampson (2004) have
argued that in order to build a sustainable competitive advantage, firms must integrate and
apply the knowledge they acquire from external resources with the knowledge they create
internally. Alliances provide a mechanism for firms to gain access to such rare complementary
resources. In fact, Mowery et al. (1996) show that organizations consider knowledge resource
complementarities while making their choice of alliance partners. Thus, firms can overcome
their internal resource limitations through strategic alliances (Burgers et al., 1993; Hagedoorn
and Schakenraad, 1994).
Since rare IT resources lead to competitive advantage, and these resources can be acquired
via strategic alliances, firms possessing rare IT resources should be in high demand as alliance
partners. For example, Kiva Systems, which is an order fulfilment company, developed and
patented a new automated robotic material handling system. Such systems are very valuable
in industries such as e-commerce and retail, leading to high demand for Kiva’s technology.
Kiva provides its systems to companies like Staples, Walgreens, Gap, Toys R Us, and many
others, and was subsequently acquired by Amazon for $775 million. Another illustration
of this phenomenon is observed in the smartphone industry. Phone manufacturers such as
Samsung and HTC have formed alliances with Google to gain access to the smartphone
operating system, Android. This technology is a rare resource since there are only a few
developers of smartphone operating systems, and Apple does not license its iOS system to
other manufacturers. By forming an alliance with Google, Samsung has attained a market
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share of 33%, which is currently double that of Apple (Oremus, 2013). The Google-led
Open Handset Alliance now has 84 participating firms, demonstrating how Google’s rare
technology has made it a key partner for firms in the smartphone industry.
Therefore, based on prior theory and anecdotal evidence, we expect that a firm with
greater possession of rare technology resources will attract a greater number of alliance
partners seeking access to its resources:
Hypothesis 2.1. Possession of rare IT resources is associated with greater formation of
alliances.
Rare resources are a source of competitive advantage, and hence organizations need to
safeguard the rare IT resources they possess. Hence, firms possessing rare resources may be
concerned about entering alliances because of the possibility that partners may take advan-
tage of the leakage of such resources (Oxley and Sampson, 2004). As the interaction between
partners increases, so does the possibility of information and resource leakage between them.
Oxley and Sampson also argue that the protection of technological knowledge becomes more
challenging if alliance partners operate jointly. Indeed, they claim that joint ventures are
most common precisely when alliance objectives require the sharing of complex knowledge,
especially in the area of technological innovation. There is considerable theoretical support
for the idea that joint ventures are used as an instrument of organizational learning Kogut
(1988); Anand and Khanna (2000) find strong learning effects in joint ventures, but do not
find such effects in alliances that involve licensing contracts. Further, learning after the for-
mation of alliances tends to increase the similarity of partners’ resources (Nakamura et al.,
1996; Dussauge et al., 2000).
Since organizations wish to guard their rare IT resources against leakage to partners,
they may try to minimize the opportunities for such leakage. Therefore, they may prefer
contractual agreements such as arm’s length alliances, which involve the selling of products
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or providing of services, rather than operating jointly with a partner, which increases the
risk of resource leakage to the partner. In fact, Kogut (1989) claims that a leading cause for
termination of joint ventures is imitation of the partner’s technology.
It can be argued that joint ventures, as a strong governance mechanism, deter opportunis-
tic behavior by the partner firm, as joint ventures require investments in capital, technology
and firm specific assets by both organizations (Tafti et al., 2013). However, even such
‘protective’ governance structures do not prevent information leakage, and the danger of op-
portunism may prevent extensive knowledge sharing among alliance partners (Inkpen, 2000;
Oxley and Sampson, 2004). Kim and Mahoney (2006) argue that the sunk costs of extensive
relation-specific IT investments can act as a deterrent to opportunistic behavior; thus, IT
investments by alliance partners can reduce the need for stricter governance mechanisms.
Summarizing the arguments above, firms possessing rare IT resources are concerned
about information leakage to alliance partners. Even strong governance mechanisms such
as joint ventures do not prevent such leakage, and therefore, we hypothesize that when
firms possessing rare IT resources form alliances, they are more likely to prefer arm’s length
alliances to joint ventures.
Hypothesis 2.2. Increased possession of rare IT resources is associated with a smaller
fraction of alliances being joint ventures.
It has been well established that alliances have a strong positive effect on firm perfor-
mance (McConnell and Nantell, 1985; Baum and Oliver, 1991; Mitchell and Singh, 1996;
Singh and Mitchell, 1996; Powell et al., 1996; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994). However,
characteristics of a focal firm may also interact with characteristics of its alliance partners
to affect the relationship between alliances and subsequent performance of the focal firm
(Stuart, 2000). One such interaction may be between the set of resources possessed by the
focal firm, and those possessed by its partners. Several papers have found limited benefit
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Figure 2.1: Longer Research Diagram caption
(in terms of firm performance) from certain alliances and acquisitions; Barney (1986) sug-
gested that additional value is obtained only when private or synergistic assets are involved.
Harrison et al. (1991) claimed that synergistic benefits are more likely to occur when the
resources of the focal firm and its alliance partner are dissimilar, rather than similar, as this
creates a resource bundle which is unique and difficult to imitate. Dissimilar resources seem
to be critical to effective alliances, as those alliances in which partners have complemen-
tary resources are most likely to create additional value (Harrison et al., 2001; Madhok and
Tallman, 1998).
Rare resources, as they are possessed by few firms, are most likely to be disimilar to
the resources of an alliance partner. As a consequence, they are most likely to provide
synergistic benefits, and hence be a source of increased performance from alliances. We
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therefore propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2.3. Possession of rare IT resources has a positive moderating influence on
firm performance subsequent to alliance formation.
2.4 Research Methodology
2.4.1 Data
The data for our study was collected from several sources. We began with publicly listed firms
that appear in the InformationWeek 2003 survey. Selection tests for this sample have been
done by prior studies such as Mithas et al. (2013) and Tafti et al. (2013). Using Dow Jones
& Company’s Factiva news and information database, we conducted a comprehensive search
for press releases that reported any alliance or joint venture activity from 1996 through 2007,
using searches on the names of the firms and conjugates of the following keywords: ”alliance,
joint venture, JV, partnership.” This search yielded 81,264 news articles mentioning inter-
firm partnerships for 64 different firms. Next, we analyzed the text of these articles to
compute scores for a list of 1,000 IT-related keywords, based on their frequency of appearance
in each article and their overall rarity in the entire corpus of text (we elaborate on measures
of term-frequency and inverse-document-frequency below). The 1,000 IT-related keywords
used in this text-analysis had been obtained independently from the glossaries of publication
websites of Information Week, ComputerWorld and e-Week in 2010 and 2011; our text-
analysis yielded instances of use for 596 out of the 1000 keywords. Of these keywords, 108
were identified as essentially duplicating other keywords in the list (for example, the list
contained both full names of various technologies and their acronyms). This left us with a
list of 488 unique technologies. We next obtained performance data and firm level controls
of the firms in our sample from the Compustat North America Database. The data was then
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combined with data from the SDC Platinum database (a product of the Thomson Reuters
Corporation) to obtain annual alliance activity statistics for each firm. SDC Platinum also
provides information about the governance type of alliances - in particular, whether each
alliance is a joint venture. We have been able to match 322 observations among these three
sources at the firm-year level.
2.4.2 Variables
Our measure of firm performance for the analysis is Tobin’s q, which is used generally
to measure intangible firm value (e.g. Lindenberg and Ross, 1981), and has been used
specifically to understand the impact of IT investments and alliances on performance (Tafti
et al., 2013; Bharadwaj et al., 1999; Lavie, 2007). Tobin’s q is calculated as in Bharadwaj
et al. (1999), reflecting the ratio of market to book value. We use the natural logarithm of
Tobin’s q in our analysis.
We use two measures of alliance formation. The first is a count of the number of arm’s
length alliances that a given firm enters into annually and is computed from a database of
alliances provided in SDC Platinum. The second is a count of those alliances that are of a
joint-venture governance type, also from SDC Platinum.
We measure the rarity of the 488 technology keywords present in the corpus of text from
press releases that mention inter-firm partnerships for our sample of 64 firms. We then find
the inverse document frequency (IDF) score of each IT-related keyword. The IDF measures
the rarity (or infrequency) of a word in a given set of documents (Salton and Buckley, 1988).
We find the IDF of each technology by taking the logarithm of the total number of press
release documents of a given firm for a given year divided by the number of documents
containing the term.
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In order to validate this measure of rarity, we show that it is significantly correlated with
the frequency of Internet searches for these terms. Google Trends is an information service
provided by Google that gives information about the relative frequency at which different
terms are searched for online. Therefore, we utilized searches in Google Trends to measure
the correlation between the frequency of keywords in our corpus of text and frequency of
Internet searches for the same keywords on Google. More precisely, we sampled 25 ran-
dom keywords from our collection of IT-related keywords, and obtained their relative search
frequencies via Google Trends. We expect that keywords with a high IDF score (i.e. rare
keywords in our text corpus) will be rarely searched for on Google, and conversely, that
keywords with a low IDF score (i.e. common words in our text corpus) will be frequently
searched for on Google. That is, the IDF score and Google search frequency should be
inversely related, and thus negatively correlated. Indeed, the Spearman’s correlation coef-
ficient between these relative search frequencies and our inverse document frequencies was
-0.65. We use Spearman’s correlation coefficient because, as a rank correlation coefficient,
it is insensitive to outliers; the extreme range of Internet search frequencies (where some
keywords are searched for thousands of times as often as others, or even more) makes other
measures such as Pearson’s correlation coefficient less appropriate. (That said, even the
Pearson’s correlation coefficient is highly negative, at -0.40.) Thus, using a distinct external
metric, we validate our choice of IDF as a proxy for the rarity of each of the 488 IT resources.
Next, we compute a measure of each firm’s possession of rare IT resources, by multiply-
ing the term-frequency (TF) for each keyword in each given firm-year by the overall IDF of
each keyword. Thus, we obtain an overall TF-IDF measure for each of the 488 IT resources
for each firm in each year. This measure reflects the relative importance of a keyword to a
document in an overall collection of documents. We adapt a framework developed by Apple-
gate et al. (2007) to classify our technologies. The framework identifies four classes of IT –
infrastructure, connectivity, systems and data, and information management. Infrastructure
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technologies include basic IT infrastructure that deploys hardware, installs and manages soft-
ware, and protects computer systems throughout the company. Connectivity technologies
are those that provide communications and connectivity between systems. These include
enterprise network management and videoconferencing systems. Systems and data technolo-
gies include consolidated corporate databases, resource management systems and complex
software packages such as enterprise resource planning systems. Information Management
technologies include technologies that capture business records, provide and monitor shared
access to documents, information warehouses, and business intelligence systems. We extend
the framework of Applegate et al. (2007) to include sourcing as another class of IT in order
to capture this important aspect of IT operations. Sourcing technologies include cloud com-
puting solutions, software as a service, and various aspects of technology outsourcing. We
classify the 488 technology keywords into these classes. We then calculate the aggregated
weight of each technology class, and get the possession of rare technology resources in each
class for each firm year. We use these as our independent variables representing possession
of the five types of rare IT resources. The average number of technologies in each class is
close to 100, and so for ease of reporting and interpreting regression coefficients, we scale
the values of these independent variables by dividing by 100 for use in our regressions. This
does not change our results except in magnitude of coefficients.
2.4.3 Empirical Models
To test the effects of the possession of rare technologies on the formation of alliances, we use
the number of alliances that a firm enters into as the dependent variable. Since the alliance
formation variable is a positive integer (taking discrete values), we use count models to test
our hypotheses for alliance formation. Our regression model assumes a negative binomial
distribution. In order to test Hypothesis 2.1 we use the possession of rare technologies in
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each of the five classes as our independent variables. In all our empirical models we control
for firm size by using the natural logarithm of the number of employees in the firm and also
for market share as the firm’s annual sales as a proportion of annual sales among all firms
sharing the same primary 3-digit NAICS industry.
To test the effects of the possession of rare technologies on the fraction of alliances which
are joint ventures, we use the number of joint ventures divided by the total number of
alliances that a firm enters into as the dependent variable. The independent variables used
in our analysis are the possession of rare technologies in each of the five classes. We use the
fractional logit model proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) to estimate the ratio.
To test our performance hypothesis 2.3 we use Tobin’s q (as the measure of firm perfor-
mance) as the dependent variable. Tobin’s q has been used as a measure of the performance
impacts of IT investments (Bharadwaj et al., 1999) as well as alliances (Lavie, 2007; Tafti
et al., 2013).
To test the effect of the number of alliances a firm enters due to its possession of rare
technologies, we use the number of alliances as the dependent variable. The independent
variables used in our analysis are the possession of rare technologies in each of the five classes
(Infrastructure, Connectivity, Systems, Information Management and Sourcing).
Alliances = αi + β1Infrastructure + β2Connectivity + β3Systems
+ β4Information Management + β5Sourcing + β6 ln(Employees)
+ β7MarketShare + it
(2.1)
To test the effect of the number of joint ventures a firm enters due to its possession of
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rare technologies we use the number of alliances as an independent variable.
Joint Venture
Total Alliances
=αi + β1Infrastructure + β2Connectivity + β3Systems
+ β4Information Management + β5Sourcing + β6 ln(Employees)
+ β7MarketShare + it
(2.2)
We also test the moderating effects of the possession of the rare technologies in each
class on the performance gains from arm’s length alliances (3) and joint venture (JV) (4)
formation.
ln(Tobin’s q) =αi + β1Arm’s Lengthβ2Infrastructure + β3Connectivity + β4Systems
+ β5Information Management + β6Sourcing + β7 ln(Employees)
+ β8MarketShare + β9Arm’s Length× Infrastructure
+ β10Arm’s Length× Connectivity + β11Arm’s Length× Systems
+ β12Arm’s Length× Information Management
+ β13Arm’s Length× Sourcing + it
(2.3)
ln(Tobin’s q) =αi + β1Joint Venture + β2Infrastructure + β3Connectivity + β4Systems
+ β5Information Management + β6Sourcing + β7 ln(Employees)
+ β8MarketShare + β10Joint Venture× Infrastructure
+ β11Joint Venture× Connectivity + β12Joint Venture× Systems
+ β13Joint Venture× Information Management




Table 2.1 shows the summary statistics and the correlation among variables of the data used
in our analysis.1 Our results show that the possession of rare technology resources has an
effect on formation of alliances and joint ventures. In Table 2.3, the dependent variable is the
total number of alliances (arm’s length and joint venture). We find that the possession of rare
infrastructure technology has a negative and significant effect (β1 = −0.039, p < 0.05) on the
formation of alliances. The implication is that in the formation of alliances, the possession
of rare infrastructure technologies means that the firm may not be able to share information
or collaborate easily with an alliance partner with more common (and therefore dissimilar)
infrastructure. We also find that rare sourcing technologies have a negative and significant
effect (β5 = −0.279, p < 0.05) on the formation of alliances. However, rare systems and data
technologies have a positive and significant effect (β3 = 0.274, p < 0.01) on the formation
of alliances. Similarly, our results show that the possession of rare information management
technologies have a positive and significant effect (β4 = 0.162, p < 0.01) on the formation of
alliances. Supporting Hypothesis 2.1, firms may form alliances to gain access to sophisticated
tools, data and information management that might enable value-creating activities.
We also investigated the effects of these rare technologies on the number of arm’s length
alliances formed, and obtained similar results. From Table 2.5, we see that possession of rare
infrastructure technologies has a negative and significant (β1−0.0397, p < 0.05 effect on the
number of arm’s length alliances formed. We also observe a negative and significant effect
(β5 = −0.2790, p < 0.05) of the possession of rare sourcing technologies on arm’s length
alliance formation. In contrast, we observe that the possession of rare systems and data
technologies has a positive and significant effect (β3 = 0.2741, p < 0.01) on the formation
of arm’s length alliances, and similarly, the possession of rare information management
1In all our regression tables, the variable with the name of a technology class denotes the possession of
rare IT resources in that class.
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technologies has a positive and significant effect (β4 = 0.1619, p < 0.01).
In Table 2.4, we see that the possession of rare connectivity resources has a negative
and significant effect (β2 = −0.115, p < 0.05) on the fraction of alliances which are joint
ventures. Our results also show that the possession of rare systems and data resources have
a negative and significant effect (β3 = −0.188, p < 0.05) on the fraction of joint ventures
formed. A similar trend is observed with information management resources, which have
a negative and significant effect (β4 = −0.191, p < 0.05) on the fraction of total alliances
being joint ventures. Thus, we see that three of the five technology classes have a negative
and significant effect on the fraction of alliances which are joint ventures. These results
support Hypothesis 2.2, suggesting that firms with rare technologies may be worried about
the leakage of information and hence be less likely to form joint ventures.
Table 2.6 includes the results of the test of our performance hypothesis 2.3. Column 1
represents the main effects of alliance formation on firm performance. The effect is signifi-
cant (β1 = 0.0242, p < 0.01), indicating that a firm’s participation in alliances is associated
with higher market value. As with the case of alliances, participation in joint ventures has
a positive relationship with performance (β1 = 0.0168, p < 0.05) represented in Table 2.7
column 1 which shows the main effect of joint venture on performance. Even controlling for
the number of arm’s length alliances or joint ventures, we observe a positive and significant
effect of systems technologies on performance, and a negative effect of information manage-
ment resources. To better understand the effect of these technologies, we then test whether
possession of rare technological resources has a moderating effect on the firm performance
gains from alliances.
We find limited support for the moderating effect hypothesized in Hypothesis 2.3. Ta-
ble 2.6 Column 2 and Table 2.7 Column 2 represent the interaction effects of rare technologies
in the context of arm’s length alliances and joint ventures. We see that rare information man-
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agement technologies have a negative and significant moderating effect on the performance
gains from arm’s length alliances (β12 = −0.007, p < 0.01) and joint ventures (β12 = −0.009,
p < 0.10). This could imply that rare information management technologies could make the
coordination between partners difficult which could affect the performance. We find only one
technology class, systems, has a positive and significant (β11 = 0.0177, p < 0.01) moderating
effect on joint ventures in value creation. A possible explanation for this is that firms pos-
sessing rare systems technologies may have sophisticated resources that are complementary
to those of their partners, and hence may derive increased performance from their alliances.
2.6 Discussion, Conclusion and Future Research
Our analysis suggests that the possession of rare technology resources is associated with the
formation of alliances. Our results show that the possession of rare systems and information
technologies has a positive effect on the formation of arms length alliances. Access to rare
systems and information technologies may be desirable to firms forming alliances as this
may provide them with sophisticated systems and tools to manage and gain insights from
their data. In contrast, we show that rare infrastructure technologies have a negative effect
on the formation of arms length alliances. This is intuitive as incompatible infrastructure
between potential partners may deter alliance formation. Similarly, rare sourcing technolo-
gies negatively affect alliance formation. This could be because focal firms possessing rare
sourcing resources do not actually possess innovative technologies themselves, but outsource
technological development to another firm and work with their technologies. The implica-
tions for IS leaders is that when considering whether to invest in rare sourcing technologies,
they should be aware of the potential negative impact on their ability to form alliances.































































































































































































































































































Hypothesis/Technology Class H1 H2 H3 H4
Infrastructure -
Connectivity -
Systems + - +
Information Management + - - -
Sourcing -
Table 2.2: Result summary showing the direction of significance for each technology class

















Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 2.3: Effect of Rare IT Resources on Total Alliance Formations
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Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 2.4: Effect of Rare IT Resources on Fraction of Alliances which are Joint Ventures
dataset affect the number of alliances formed, are encouraging for two reasons: 1) the core
idea in our theory is that access to rare technology resources matters to firms in their choice
of alliance formation. This idea appears to have merit and suggests that further effort to test
the theory is worthwhile; 2) the variation in the effects by technology classes indicates that
different technology resources may have different effects. There is a significant opportunity
to provide granularity to the level of technology types, driving the theoretical development
to a level of practical interest and relevance to managers.
We also see that possession of rare technologies in three of our five classes are associated
with a smaller fraction of total alliances being joint ventures. As we hypothesized, this could
be explained by the fear of knowledge leakage of the rare technologies.
We find some indication of a moderating relationship between the possession of rare
technology resources and the effect of alliance formation on firm performance. We find a
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Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 2.5: Effect of Rare IT Resources on Total Arm’s Length Alliance Formations
positive interaction effect of rare systems technologies with joint ventures on performance.
This indicates that the presence of rare systems technologies may result in high synergies
between complementary resources when forming joint ventures. Rare information manage-
ment technologies, on the other hand, have a negative interaction effect with the performance
gains from both arm’s length alliances and joint ventures, which may be due to the fact that
the presence of rare information technologies makes the communication between alliance
partners more difficult.
However, moderating relationships were found among just two of five technology classes.
A number of explanations may apply, including lack of statistical power to demonstrate
the relationship, identification of the single technology type for which there is the theorized
relationship or a lack of relationship accompanied by a false positive test. Further research
needs to be done to clarify the extent of these relationships.
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(1) (2)
Variable Performance Effects Performance Effects
with Interactions
(Arm’s Length) (Arm’s Length)
β1 Arm’s Length 0.0242*** 0.0302***
(0.0043) (0.0090)
β2 Infrastructure 0.0022 -0.0062
(0.0118) (0.0149)
β3 Connectivity 0.0116 -0.0061
(0.0114) (0.0150)
β4 Systems 0.0682*** -0.0518*
(0.0235) (0.0292)
β5 Information Management -0.0797** 0.0113
(0.0320) (0.0434)
β6 Sourcing -0.0081 -0.0733
(0.0884) (0.1144)
β7 Employees -0.0243 -0.0290
(0.0440) (0.0445)
β8 MarketShare 0.1777 0.2523
(0.6472) (0.6489)
















Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 2.6: Performance Effects – Arm’s Length
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(1) (2)
Variable Performance Effects Performance Effects
with Interactions
(Joint Ventures) (Joint Ventures)
β1 Joint Venture 0.0168** 0.0012
(0.0081) (0.0140)
β2 Infrastructure -0.0028 -0.0020
(0.0123) (0.0127)
β3 Connectivity 0.0063 0.0009
(0.0118) (0.0120)
β4 Systems 0.0975*** 0.0659***
(0.0239) (0.0252)
β5 Information Management -0.0422** -0.0187
(0.0326) (0.0337)
β6 Sourcing -0.0181 0.0036
(0.0924) (0.0924)
β7 Employees -0.0360 -0.0164
(0.0460) (0.0454)


















Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 2.7: Performance Effects – Joint Ventures
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We note that acquisitions are another method, not considered in our analysis, by which
organizations may try to gain access to rare technologies possessed by other firms. For
example, in a recent case in the fast-growing area of voice recognition software, Nuance
Technologies acquired Vlingo in order to gain access to the rare technologies in voice recog-
nition possessed by Vlingo (Duhigg and Lohr 2012). However, both firms may prefer an
alliance to an acquisition; the firm seeking access to rare technologies of the other may only
wish to get access to certain resources of the alliance partner, and may not want to make
the much larger investment that would be necessary to acquire the partner firm. Similarly,
the firm possessing rare technologies may not wish to be acquired by another, preferring to
remain independent. In a recent example of this, the photo sharing application Snapchat
recently turned down an acquisition offer from Facebook of $3 billion, even though Snapchat
currently has no revenue source. Further, from the perspective of the firm possessing a rare
technology, alliances have the benefit of often being non-exclusive; the firm can ally with
multiple partners who wish to gain this rare technology, and obtain improved performance
from all these alliances.
It is also challenging from an empirical perspective to analyze the role of rarity in de-
termining whether a firm is acquired; this is because our sample of acquisitions is limited.
Only 8 of the 64 firms in our dataset were acquired in the period of our study, and another
8 participated in a merger.2 Since each firm is acquired at most once, it is difficult to sep-
arate the influence of rarity from various firm-specific factors. In contrast, our focal firms
participate in multiple arm’s length alliances and joint ventures in each year, which allows
us to eliminate firm-specific effects. Therefore, for both theoretical and empirical reasons,
we consider the role of rarity only in alliances.
Finally, there are a number of additional research opportunities in this context. The
2Many of the focal firms in our dataset acquired other organizations, but these acquisitions may be driven
by rare resources of the acquired firms (which are not part of our dataset), and not by the technologies of
our focal firms.
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same empirical strategy may be employed with other firm-specific resources besides IT re-
sources (e.g. marketing, finance, and production). Additional measures may be useful to
further characterize the alliance formation. For example, the use of total value of alliance
events would bring the element of scale into the analysis and might yield interesting insights
regarding how larger alliances may require more attention to the rarity of technology re-
sources. The opportunity exists to further explore the relationship between other attributes
of technology resources and alliance formation. For example, resource attributes may in-
clude durability, mobility, tradability, appropriability, and institutional context (Collis and
Montgomery, 1995; Maurer et al., 2011). Lastly, the importance of rare technology resources
is almost certain to influence performance in many different governance types. It might be
interesting to study how the existence of such resources modifies inter-organizational rela-






The goal of Information Systems Management is to improve the performance of the IT in-
vestments of an organization by aligning its IT initiatives with its business goals (Sabherwal
and Chan, 2001). Information Systems executives may manage their IT assets in a manner
similar to investments in a financial portfolio (Maizlish and Handler 2005) and make funding
decisions for IT projects, manage risks (McFarlan, 1981), maximize profits, prioritize and
allocate resources among competing initiatives, and make plans to ensure that the organi-
zation’s IT portfolio enables a long-term competitive advantage. We have already seen that
planning involves both determining an “end” or goal state for the organization, and the
“means” to get there. How do organizations perform this planning, selecting both means
and ends?
In this chapter, we describe a mathematically principled framework that models this
planning process. Note that we do not reduce planning to an optimization problem; this is
not a black-box tool for planning that spits out an ‘optimal’ plan. Instead, it closely models
many important features of planning, illustrating how different managerial choices can result
in considerably different plans.
In Chapter 2, we demonstrated that rarity of IT capabilities plays a role in firm perfor-
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mance, and hence is one of the factors that determines the value of a possible goal state.
However, do firms always choose the goal state with maximal value? We posit that this is not
the case; here are 3 distinct approaches that a firm may employ, and still other approaches
may be possible.
1. Find the goal state with the maximum value. Then find the most effective / efficient
way to reach this state.
2. For each possible goal state of the organization, there is a certain value the organization
derives from it, but also a cost to build the necessary IT capabilities. The organization
may wish to maximize its quasi-linear utility, which can be understood as the difference
between the value and the cost (i.e., the profit).
3. The organization may have an IT budget. Subject to the constraint that its total IT
investments do not exceed this budget, it may wish to achieve the most valuable goal
state.
Note that the second and third approaches require that even in order to choose a goal
state, the organization must first know the cost of the most effective way to reach each
potential goal. Even under the first approach, once an organization has chosen a goal, it
will still desire to find an effective means to accomplish this goal. Organizations may use
any of these approaches, or others; in this chapter, we focus on building a general model to
understand how organizations using any approach make effective plans.
3.2 Literature Review
We begin our discussion of the relevant prior work with an overview of the literature in
strategic IS planning. Our contributions to the IS planning literature in this chapter are
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two-fold: we develop a formal mathematical model of the Information Systems planning
process, and study the effect of the length of planning horizon in the presence of varying levels
of uncertainty. We then discuss the relevant literature for each of these two contributions
separately.
3.2.1 Strategic Information Systems Planning
Strategic Information Systems Planning (SISP) is the process of choosing a portfolio of
Information Technology applications that support an organization’s business plans, align its
information systems with business needs and achieve its business goals (Chi et al., 2005;
Reich and Benbasat, 1996). Improving strategic planning within the realm of Information
Systems is consistently identified by top executives as a critical competitive issue (Segars
et al., 1998; Segars and Grover, 1999; Luftman et al., 2009; Brown, 2010).
King (1988) describes the IS strategic plan, which can be viewed as a set of choices that
have been made during the planning process, as a primary output of the IS planning system;
Lederer and Salmela (1996) concur in this view that the tangible output of the planning pro-
cess is the plan (see also Brown, 2010). However, it is challenging to empirically analyze the
effectiveness of a plan, as there is typically no clear and general operational definition of suc-
cess (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1987). Some attempts have been made to develop such
operational measures (Segars and Grover, 1998) by measuring certain factors which seem
to be correlated to planning success such as alignment of IS and business strategy, analysis
conducted by IS planners, cooperation between managers, and improvement in capabilities.
Most of the research in this area has focused on self-evaluations of plan effectiveness by
senior IS managers (e.g. Lederer and Sethi, 1996; Segars and Grover, 1999; Newkirk et al.,
2003).
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Much of the prior literature, therefore, has focused on analyzing the IS planning process
itself, rather than on the resulting plans or their effectiveness. Segars et al. (1998) and Segars
and Grover (1999) identify several key process dimensions of Strategic IS planning:
Comprehensiveness has been identified as an important dimension of planning in strate-
gic management (Fredrickson, 1984; Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984; Fredrickson, 1986). It
is commonly understood to involve the canvassing of a large set of alternatives and multiple
objectives, evaluating these carefully, examining their consequences in detail, and including
plans for different future contingencies (Segars and Grover, 1999). Comprehensiveness has
also been extensively studied in the SISP context. Lederer and Sethi (1996) identify the
debating of many alternatives and examining of future scenarios as factors critical for suc-
cessful SISP. Several authors have considered the question of when comprehensive planning
is most important: Sabherwal and King (1995) study different approaches to IS planning
and decision-making, and find that about a third of firms in their study use a formal and
comprehensive planning process; this is most commonly used by organizations operating in
heterogeneous external environments. Sambamurthy et al. (1993) argue that lower levels of
comprehensiveness are appropriate for situations when IT planning groups have low levels
of knowledge and experience, and face low levels of agreement on major IT issues; in con-
trast, comprehensive planning processes are appropriate for organizations with high levels
of IT planning knowledge and experience, and when there is consensus on major issues.
Based on data from state government agencies, Sambamurthy et al. (1994) conclude that
comprehensive planning is most important in less complex and turbulent environments; in
contrast, plans which are incremental instead of comprehensive are likely to be more useful
in environments of high uncertainty.
Flow, as a planning dimension, refers to the direction of information transfer in planning:
In “top-down” approaches, senior managers are involved in making the plan, and there is
limited input from lower levels of management. In contrast, “bottom-up” planning flow
39
begins with ideas and suggestions from lower-levels of the organization, which ultimately
form the input to the strategic plan. Byrd et al. (1995), in a survey of state goverment
agencies, find that most of the participating organizations used a top-down flow. Pyburn
(1983) finds that bottom-up approaches tend to be more successful when the senior IS
managers have high status within the organization: This appears to be related to the fact
that when the senior-most IS manager has low status within the organization, the role of
IT seems to be to fulfill pre-determined organizational needs; in this case, the top-down
approach seems to be more successful. Das et al. (1991), using the organizational strategy
profiles of Miles and Snow (1978), argue that top-down approaches are more common in
Defenders, while bottom-up approaches are more common for Prospectors.
A closely related dimension to flow is participation, which captures the breadth of in-
volvement in IS planning across the organization. While high participation ensures that
information from a variety of sources is considered, it can lead to lower decision speeds be-
cause of the involvement of many participants (Segars and Grover, 1999; Lederer and Sethi,
1996; Byrd et al., 1995).
Finally, we discuss the dimension of formalization below:
3.2.2 Modeling Planning Systems and Effectiveness
Formalization has been described as one of the key process characteristics of strategic infor-
mation systems planning (Segars and Grover, 1999). A highly formalized planning system is
a rational process for planning; firms may vary in the degree of formalization their planning
systems exhibit, but there have been attempts to show linkage between the formalization
of planning practices and financial performance (Hofer and Schendel, 1978; Lorange, 1978).
However, there have been few previous attempts to formally model the planning process;
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reasons for this include the fact that SISP is a complex activity with a variety of benefits,
and capturing its contribution in terms of bottom-line figures can be confounded by a va-
riety of external factors (Grover and Segars, 2005). One key difficulty has been the lack
of appropriate operationalizing methods for measuring the success of the planning system
(Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1987).
King (1988) defines Planning Effectiveness as how well the planning system has met
its goals. Raghunathan and Raghunathan (1989) evaluate planning system success as
the fulfilment of objectives and system capability; here, systems capability represents an
improvement-oriented perspective where the effectiveness of the system is compared to its
effectiveness at a previous time. Such measures are inherently subjective, and exhibit con-
siderable inter-firm variance. A more grounded measure is the impact of the planning system
on organizational performance, as the belief that planning positively affects the performance
of the firm is a critical assumption for the value of planning (Henderson and Sifonis, 1988;
Venkatraman, 1985). Indeed, Ramanujam and Venkatraman (1987), supporting earlier work
(Henry, 1979) claim that “there are strong arguments that the ultimate test of the planning
system’s effectiveness and justification for its existence is the impact on organizational per-
formance.” Similarly, short-term performance and long-term performance were identified as
two of the important goals for planning (Segars and Grover, 1998). Hence, organizational
performance is the measure of plan effectiveness that we adopt for our work.
3.2.3 Planning Horizon
The planning horizon may be defined as the period of time for which the organization’s plans
are developed (Das, 1991) or the time period from the beginning of the execution of a plan
to its conclusion (Chi et al., 2005). Planning horizon has been identified as a key temporal
dimension of planning for over three decades (Camillus, 1982). Prior literature has discussed
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the impact of length of planning horizon on organizational effectiveness (Das, 1991) and as
an important part of strategies (Taylor and Hawkins, 1972).
Effective users of information resources tend to employ planning horizons (McFarlan,
1971). Lederer and Sethi (1988) showed that problems faced in the Strategic IS planning
process were higher for firms that did not specify a planning horizon than for those that did,
because the use of a planning horizon forces planning teams to be more detailed in their
analysis and to develop a schedule.
IS planning horizons vary depending on business planning horizons, management style,
and other organizational factors (Martin, 1982). Information Systems planning horizons
typically range from 1 to 5 years (Premkumar and King, 1994). The planning time horizon
has often been used as a measure of the organization’s time frame (Ein-Dor and Segev,
1982; Rhyne, 1986). It influences the scope of planning, the issues addressed, and planning
priorities (Martin, 1982; King and Cleland, 1978; Digman, 1990). Some studies (McLean and
Soden, 1977; Martino, 1983) have found that the IS planning time horizon matches better
with the often-longer business planning time horizon in firms with good IS planning, but
tends to be lower for firms where the emphasis is on budgeting and operational planning.
Relatedly, Premkumar and King (1992) find that planning horizons tend to be longer in firms
that expect future strategic benefits from IS, regardless of whether they currently derive such
strategic benefits.
Empirical studies in strategic business planning have found that firms with a longer busi-
ness planning time horizon exhibit better performance (Rhyne, 1986; Bracker and Pearson,
1986; Bracker et al., 1988). However, research on the impact of longer planning horizons
specifically for information systems has been less definitive. The nature of some of the ac-
tivities of strategic IS planning, such as the design of IS architectures, suggest that a longer
time horizon should lead to better planning. However, empirical work on this question has
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been far from conclusive: the only relevant study has found only a very weak correlation
between the length of planning horizon and planning effectiveness (Premkumar and King,
1994). Newkirk et al. (2008) show that longer information systems planning horizons lead
to more planning via mechanisms such as the consideration of more alternatives, but this
did not necessarily lead to more effective plans. They also found that, contrary to expecta-
tions, organizations facing rapid business and IT change did not tend to use shorter planning
horizons; see Section 3.6 for a full discussion.
Our work in this area attempts to address this gap in the literature, by thoroughly
examining the effects of planning horizon on IT plan effectiveness. As such, it also has
important managerial implications.
3.3 States, Capabilities, and Costs
Since one of the first steps in planning is choosing a goal state of the organization, a compre-
hensive understanding of organizational IT state is crucial for effective Information Systems
planning. This helps in understanding the difference between the current state of the orga-
nization and its goal state which is referred to as the gap. Once the gap is understood, this
helps in determining the IT investments the organization needs to make in order to close
this gap.
Depending on context, it may be useful to view the state of an organization at different
levels of abstraction. For instance, when trying to understand the performance of different
projects or identify patterns leading to project under-performance, it is useful to consider the
organizational state at a project level. In this chapter, we view the state of the organization
at the capability level. This is a more high-level view, useful when considering the overall
goal of the organization and possible modifications to it.
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Capabilities are an essential unit of analysis when considering organizational perfor-
mance; Helfat and Winter (2011) define capabilities as the ability to repeatedly and reliably
perform an activity with a specific, intended purpose. As such, a firm’s capabilities are its
primary sources of value; they are what permit a firm to attract and retain customers, obtain
revenue, and perform all the other activities necessary to remain profitable (Winter, 2003;
Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). We focus on Information Technology-specific capabilities in
this dissertation, as our aim is a better understanding of Information Systems planning. Ca-
pabilities are a particularly appropriate unit of analysis here, as IT capabilities are typically
technical in nature, and hence are discrete and can be explicitly planned and built. Further,
they are at the appropriate analysis level as value sources; an IT investment in a project that
is not tied to a specific purpose, or that does not result in repeatable and reliable outcomes
does not truly generate value for a firm.
3.3.1 Organizational Costs
Making an IT investment (to build a capability) obviously involves incurring a cost by the
organization. It is important to note, though, that this cost can be measured in different
ways. First, and most obviously, there is the financial cost associated with an investment.
However, this is only one of many such costs. For example, the time that an organization
spends to build a particular capability could also have been spent on building a different
capability; this time cost is only one of many opportunity costs that an organization may in-
cur. Resource costs are another important class of costs with natural budgets; organizations
may have limited amounts of employee time (resulting in a man-hour cost), for instance.
An important and relevant class of costs for our setting is associated with IT infrastructure;
there are typically costs of servers, data storage, bandwidth, computing power, etc. These
costs may be implicit, in that the organization maintains a limited amount of such com-
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puting infrastructure that can be used arbitrarily, or explicit, as in certain cloud computing
providers that explicitly charge per unit of storage, bandwidth, computation, etc.
We assume subsequently that an organization can estimate a cost of each investment
along those dimensions that it is concerned with. We do not assume that these estimates are
perfect or accurate. Indeed, it is an essential feature of our models and simulations that these
estimates may change as organizations obtain new information (either due to environmental
changes, or due to explicit organizational learning). Still, organizations must be able to
work with some estimate of the cost of an investment, even if it is only a distribution on
possible costs, or upper and lower bounds on costs. We believe this assumption is completely
natural and justified in practice; very few organizations, if any, will be willing to make an
IT investment with no regard to cost.
When there are multiple dimensions of costs, there will very naturally be tradeoffs among
them. We mentioned earlier that given a goal, an organization will choose the most effective
or least cost way to achieve it. This is not uniquely defined in the case of multiple cost
dimensions. We assume, though, that the organization will choose some method that is
among the efficient frontier, or set of Pareto Optimal solutions. (A solution P is said to be
Pareto Optimal if there is no other solution P’ which is superior to it in all dimensions, or
more formally, if there is no solution P’ which is superior to P in at least one dimension, and
not inferior to P in any dimension. Clearly, an organization should never choose a solution
P which is not Pareto Optimal, as it could obtain a strictly better outcome by choosing a
superior solution P’.) An important feature of our model and simulation framework is that it
can generate the set of Pareto Optimal solutions (that is, the entire efficient frontier) among
which managers choose one.
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3.4 Organizational IT State Descriptions
As mentioned earlier, we primarily focus on understanding organizational state at the capa-
bility level. Thus, the state of an organization is essentially described by the set of capabilities
that it possesses, as well as the set of capabilities that is in the process of being constructed.
However, the organization, when measuring its state, will collect additional data for various
purposes. For comprehensiveness, we list some of these below.
To understand the performance of different projects or identifying patterns leading to
project underperformance, the organization must collect data at a project level. There
are four sets of projects integral to describing the state of the IT portfolio (or suite of IT
investments) of an organization:
* S1 – the set of IT projects that have been successfully completed.
* S2 – the set of IT projects currently in progress.
* S3 – the set of previously attempted IT projects which have been cancelled.
* S4 – the set of IT projects that the organization wants to implement in the future.
We also define a cost function c1 : S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3 → R+ as the amount (already) spent on
each IT project. We define a second cost function c2 : S2 ∪ S4 → R+ as the total projected
cost of a project in S2 ∪ S4. Thus, for project p ∈ S2 ∪ S3, c2(p) − c1(p) is the projected
remaining cost for completion. (Note that for projects p ∈ S4, c1(p) can be defined as 0
since no money has been spent on a project which has not been started; thus, the projected
remaining cost is the same as the projected total cost.)
A budget function B : S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3 → R+ denotes the initial planned budget for each
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project. Note that for projects in S1, the functions B and c1 naturally induce a new function
γ : S1 → R+. The function γ = c1/B denotes the ratio of the actual cost to the budgeted
cost for each project. A project that completes on budget will have γ = 1, while a project
that finished under budget till have γ ≤ 1.
Note that though c1 was defined on individual projects, i.e. singleton subsets of S1∪S2∪
S3, we can naturally extend it to arbitrary subsets. Therefore:




One can similarly extend the budget function B, and also extend the function c2 to
subsets of S2 ∪ S4. Similarly to cost, we define time function t1 : S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3 → R+ as the
amount of time (already) spent on each IT project. We also define a second time function
t2 : S2 ∪ S4 → R+ as the total projected time of a project in S2 ∪ S4. Thus, for project
p ∈ S2 ∪ S4, t2(p) − t1(p) is the projected remaining time for completion. We also define a
planned duration function D : S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3 → R+ to represent the initial forecast duration
for each project. As before, for projects in S1, the functions D and t1 induce a new delay
function δ : S1 → R+ = t1/D, denoting the ratio of the projected time to the actual time
for each project. A project that completes on or ahead of schedule will have δ ≤ 1.
Each project is associated with one or more strategy goals. If G denotes the set of strategy
goals of the organization, we define the alignment function α : (S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3 ∪ S4) → 2G.
(Here, 2G denotes the set of subsets of strategy goals, also referred to as the power set.) For
p ∈ S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3 ∪ S4, α(p) = G ⊆ G implies that project p is aligned with the set of goals
in G.
Therefore, the state of an organization from the project perspective can be defined as
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the tuple:
(S1, S2, S3, c1, c2, B, γ, t1, t2, D, δ,G, α)
Understanding of states from a project perspective can be useful when trying to under-
stand the performance of different projects or identify patterns leading to project underper-
formance (see also Section 4.2 for a concrete example). Examining the states at this level
allows us to identify project performance patterns such as:
∀s ∈ S1(c1(s) > $10 million)⇒ E[δ(s)] > 1;
Which denotes the pattern or fact that projects with a large cost (greater than $10
million) tend to exceed the time allotted (perhaps due to the high complexity required). In
Chapter 4, we discuss in more detail both project performance data and patterns that can
be learned from this data.
In this chapter, we focus more on viewing the state of the organization at the capability
level. In this view, the organization’s state defines the set of capabilities which have been
built, and hence are possessed by the organization. Let A1 denote these capabilities. As
capabilities are built as a consequence of successful IT investments, these naturally induce a
map pi1 ⊆ S1×A1, where (p, a) ∈ pi1 denotes that project p was required to build capability
a. The set of capabilities currently being built, A2, is also important, and induces the map
pi2 ⊆ (S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S4)× A2. By definition of capabilities in A2 currently being developed:
∀a ∈ A2, ∃p ∈ S2 ∪ S4 such that ∃(p, a) ∈ pi2
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One can also define a function PV : A1 ∪ A2 → R+ that gives the present value of each
capability. However, different capabilities in the portfolio may exhibit various complementar-
ity and substitutability effects. Thus, we have a 2-dimensional matrix V ∈ R|A1∪A2|×|A1∪A2|,
where V [a1, a2] = r implies that the additional value obtained from capability a1 when a2 is
also completed is r. Note that this matrix is not necessarily symmetric; we do not require
that V [a1, a2] = V [a2, a1]. This permits one-way complementarity and substitutability ef-
fects. Such a matrix V is sometimes referred to as a synergy matrix, but note that we permit
negative entries (to capture substitutability and similar effects). Therefore, the present value










We note that synergies and similar effects may be more complex than can be captured
with the preceding pairwise representation. Indeed, complementarity effects can be described
more generally by supermodular functions. A function PV (A) is said to be submodular if
it exhibits substitutability effects and diminishing returns; a function is supermodular if its
negative is submodular. We omit further discussion of submodularity and supermodularity
from this discussion, as we feel that pairwise effects dominate IT portfolio synergies.
Each capability may also be aligned with one or more strategy goals. As for projects,
we can define an alignment function α : A1 ∪A2 → 2G, where α(a) = G ⊆ G means that the
capability a is aligned with the set of strategy goals in G.
For the capability view, then, we can consider the state as being described by the tuple:
(S1, S2, A1, A2, pi1, pi2,G, α, PV, V )
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Here, we are no longer interested in low-level details such as which projects ran over
budget and were subsequently cancelled, or whether a project is built in-house or outsourced,
etc.; instead, we focus on additional elements such as the organizational goals and alignment
of capabilities with goals. However, when evaluating the efficacy of investments / projects,
costs, times, and value are important dimensions to be considered. Therefore, along with
the projects in S1 and S2, we retain the cost functions c1, c2, and time functions t1, t2 from
the project view.
3.5 Markov Decision Processes
3.5.1 Defining Markov Decision Processes
A Markov Decision Process is a mathematical object that has five components (Q,Σ, s, F, δ).
Q is a set, referred to as the set of states. Σ is a set of actions that can be performed. One
of the states is the start states, where s ∈ Q. The state transition diagram has one or
more final states denoted as F ⊆ Q. The transition rules define a function δ : QxΣ → a
probability distribution on Q; intuitively, if you are currently in a state and perform an
action the transition rule will tell you which states you may possibly move to next, along
with the probability of moving to each of those states. In many applications, each transition
T has a cost c(T ) or value v(T ) associated with it. Markov Decision Processes can be used
for planning. The goal of the planning system is to find a path (a series of transitions) from
the start state to a final state. If there are many paths, we might want to pick the minimum
cost path P∗ = arg minP{cost(P )} or the maximum value path P∗ = arg maxP{value(P )}.




3.5.2 Information Systems Planning using Markov Decision
Processes
Markov Decision Processes can be used in Information Systems planning. As discussed
in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, we represent each possible organizational state with the set of
IT capabilities that the organization possesses in that state. The start state is the set of
capabilities the organization has at the beginning of the IT planning process. The actions
Σ correspond to a set of investments in IT projects, which can be used to build capabilities.
Each final state represents one of the possible sets of capabilities the organization wants to
build.
The transition rules capture the relationship between project investments and new capa-
bilities: If you have a set of capabilities (current state) and make an IT investment (action)
then you may have a new set of capabilities (future state). Note that IT investments out-
comes are inherently stochastic; projects may not perform as expected or there may be
environmental changes. Therefore, the outcome of a particular investment is uncertain,
which is captured by the probabilistic transition rules. For example, in a given state S, if an
organization invests in a project P to build a capability C, the transition rule may describe
possible outcomes such as: P succeeds with probability 0.4, leading to state S1 in which
capability C has been achieved; P partially succeeds with probability 0.25, leading to state
S2, in which C is still being in the process of being built; and P fails entirely with probability
0.35, leaving the set of IT capabilities possessed by the organization unchanged.
The goal of capability based planning is to find a roadmap to move from the current state
(operationalized as set of capabilities) to the desired state (a different set of capabilities).
A roadmap corresponds to a path from the start state to a final state. To move from one
state to another, the organization will need to make a set of IT investments. Each project
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Figure 3.1: Example Markov Decision Process illustrating 2 paths to a goal state
investment has a cost or value associated with it. The cost can be a financial cost, time cost,
resource cost, or opportunity cost to name a few of the more common costs. The cost can
also be multi-dimensional. In order to build the desired set of capabilities, an organization
can plan the least cost path or the maximum value path, or a path of maximum net value
(defined as value - cost).
Figure 3.1 shows an example with two distinct paths to the same goal; the first path is
marked with dashed red lines, while the second is marked with blue dotted lines. The pair
of numbers above each edge denote two dimensions of costs. The red path has a total cost
of 26 in the first dimension and 33 in the second dimension. The blue path has a total cost
of 35 in the first dimension and 30 in the second dimension.
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3.6 Length of IT Planning Horizon, and its impact on
Plan Effectiveness
Now that we have developed an effective framework that models and captures important
features of the Information Systems planning framework, we can use it to understand the
consequences of various decisions adopted by IT managers, or of various planning dimen-
sions. In particular, in this section, we focus on the length of the IT planning horizon.
Planning horizon has been identified as a key temporal dimension of planning (Camillus,
1982). However, research about planning horizons in strategic management has lacked both
scope and depth (Das, 1991, 2004; Newkirk et al., 2008). Our work in this area attempts to
address this gap in the literature, by thoroughly examining the effects of planning horizon
on IT plan effectiveness. As such, it also has important managerial implications.
As mentioned above, we study the effect of the length of the planning horizon on plan
effectiveness. One might expect that longer plan horizons offer more opportunities for plan-
ning and optimization, thus leading to more effective plans. Indeed, the fact that longer
planning horizons lead to more planning via mechanisms such as the consideration of more
alternatives was a key finding of Newkirk et al. (2008).
We hypothesize, though, that longer planning horizons are not always desirable. In
particular, organizations which operate aggressively, take more risks, and are faced with
dynamic environments and uncertainty may benefit from shorter planning horizons. To
ground our contributions in existing theory, we classify organizations as either Prospectors
or Defenders. This popular typology was introduced by Miles and Snow (1978), and has
been extensively discussed and empirically analyzed (Zahra and Pearce, 1990; Delery and
Doty, 1996; Gilbert, 1995; Doty et al., 1993; Segev, 1989). The IS implications of these
strategies have also been studied in detail (Camillus and Lederer, 1985; Karimi et al., 1996;
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Gilbert, 1995; Sabherwal and Chan, 2001). Defenders tend to operate in narrow and stable
market domains, rarely making major technological changes; on the other hand, Prospectors
tend to experiment with new products and technologies, and operate in changing domains
(Delery and Doty, 1996). Two primary differences between Prospectors and Defenders are
relevant to our work, uncertainty and risk.
3.6.1 Uncertainty
The first main difference between Prospectors and Defenders is that Prospectors pursue new
markets and develop innovative technologies, while Defenders operate in stable markets and
focus on operational efficiency, importing new technologies only when they have been proven
to work at other firms (Sabherwal and Chan, 2001). Hence, Prospectors face high levels of
uncertainty (Miles and Snow, 1978); they invest in new products and markets of uncertain
and unproven value and in IT projects of unpredictable costs. Thus, Prospectors must deal
with both high value uncertainty and high cost uncertainty in their IT investments, while
Defenders face lower uncertainty in both these dimensions.
3.6.2 Risk
A second key difference between Defenders and Prospectors is their tolerance towards risk
(Delery and Doty, 1996). Clearly, both Defenders and Prospectors consider both risk and
return when evaluating IT investments: Given two projects which would have similar return
if the projects succeed but which have widely differing risk, both types of organizations
would choose the lower-risk project. Similarly, given two projects with the same risk level
but different returns, both types of organizations would choose the project with higher
return. Thus, they both value low risks and high returns. They differ, however, in their
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relative valuation of these two objectives. Defenders are more risk-averse (Sabherwal and
Chan, 2001), and hence demand a lower risk for a given level of return than a Prospector
might be willing to accept.
What is the expected return that an organization gets by investing in a risky project?
This is given by the product of the return if the project succeeds times the success probability.
That is:
Expected Return = (1 - risk) ∗ return
Thus, projects with higher return or lower risk tend to have higher expected returns.
Prospectors do not avoid risks, and we model this by assuming that Prospectors try
to maximize the expected return of their investments. That is, given a choice between a
projects that returns $4 million if it succeeds and has a failure probability of 0.25, or a
riskier project that returns $6.5 million if it succeeds, and has a failure probability of 0.45,
the prospector will choose the second project. (The expected return of 0.55 * 6.5 > 0.75 *
4.)
Defenders, on the other hand, are risk-averse. They do not choose projects solely by
expected return; faced with a choice between the same two projects, they may choose the
former project, which has a lower risk, even though it has a lower expected return. Defenders,
then, attempt to maximize a risk-adjusted return. This can be modeled by assuming that
defenders maximize their expected return - the standard deviation of the return, as the latter
term models the riskiness of the project. The standard deviation of a project is given by:
Standard Deviation = return ∗
√
risk ∗ (1− risk)
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For a defender,
Risk adjusted return = Expected return− Standard Deviation of the return.
For the two projects above ($4 million with a failure probability of 0.25, and $6 million
with a failure probability of 0.45), the standard deviations are $1.732 million and $3.234
million respectively. Thus, the risk-adjusted expected returns of these projects are $1.268
million and $316, 000 respectively. Thus, the Defender will pick the former project. The
second project, because it is so risky (almost as likely to fail as to succeed), is not attractive
to the Defender.
Thus, out of a portfolio (or universe) of possible projects, the set of projects that will be
considered by a Prospector will be those with high values of expected return, while the set of
projects that will be considered by the Defender are those with high values of risk-adjusted
expected return. Thus, the projects chosen by Prospectors are likely to have higher failure
probabilities (Miles et al., 1978). There may of course be overlap among the projects; both
organizations are likely to select projects with high return and low risk, if these exist.
Based on these differences between Defenders and Prospectors, we argue that these two
types of organizations may benefit from adopting different planning horizons. Defenders,
who focus on operational efficiency, will benefit from longer planning horizons and the op-
portunities for more planning and optimization. Such maximal efficiency entails not only
determining which capabilities to build, but optimizing the precise sequence of investments
to minimize cost and risk; this clearly requires planning far into the future. Since Defenders
operate in stable environments with low uncertainty, they can indeed make such long-range
planning decisions, possibly making expensive investments in the short term which allow
them to gain rewards later. In general, Defenders benefit from plans with a high degree of
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comprehensiveness, which involves considering a large number of options, and many possible
(even long-term) outcomes of decisions (Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984; Grover and Segars,
2005). Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3.1. Organizations with the Defender profile benefit from long IT planning
horizons.
On the other hand, Prospectors, who typically face high levels of uncertainty and high
levels of project failure, will benefit from shorter planning horizons and the ability to rapidly
respond to changing circumstances (Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984). Shorter planning hori-
zons may allow Prospectors to derive most value in the short term; in contrast, long-term
plans they make are likely to depend on assumptions and estimates that are no longer valid
at the time they are relevant. Investing in a complex capability that is likely to take con-
siderable time to develop and still longer before it generates a return may be fruitless if
the organization moves into a new product or market where this capability is not valuable.
Thus, we propose the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3.2. Organizations with the Prospector profile benefit from short IT planning
horizons.
Similar hypotheses were proposed by Newkirk et al. (2008). However, their research only
considered whether organizations facing uncertainty actually used shorter planning horizons;
it did not attempt to answer the question of whether such organizations should use shorter
planning horizons. That is, their work was descriptive, not prescriptive, and this is an
unavoidable limitation of their approach. We complement this previous work by simulating
the planning process with horizons of different length, and measuring the effectiveness of the
plans produced. This allows us to draw objective conclusions about the consequences of using
different planning horizon lengths. We show that organizations facing significant uncertainty
should use shorter planning horizons. The practical implications for IT leadership are clear:
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Though Newkirk et al. (2008) found that such organizations are not currently using shorter
planning horizons, we show that they should.
3.7 Computational Methodology
3.7.1 Capabilities and Projects
At the start state, we assume that the organization has no capabilities. There are N capa-
bilities that an organization can possibly build. Each capability is built by investing in one
or more (possibly several) projects. For our simulations, time is divided into discrete units
(such as three months, or half a year) corresponding to the intervals at which organizational
plans are evaluated, and units of work are planned. We assume that each project requires one
time unit to complete; of course, IT investments may vary in scope, size, and time required,
but such larger projects can be broken into sub-projects. Indeed, large software projects are
commonly broken down into smaller units of work to ensure that intermediate goals are met,
and the projects stay close to schedule. Thus, this assumption does not affect the validity of
our simulations; large projects are conceptually represented as several smaller sub-projects.
Since building a capability depends on completion of several projects, a capability may take
several time units to build. We also assume that in a single time step, an organization can
only implement a single project.
The objective function in our simulations is net value, i.e. the difference between value
generated and costs incurred. As discussed in Section 3.3, capabilities are the source of
value for the firm; investments in IT projects that do not lead to new or improved firm
capabilities do not generate value. Therefore, in our simulations, value is obtained from a
capability only if it is fully built. Partially built capabilities do not contribute any value to
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the objective. However, the costs of projects corresponding to partially built capabilities are
indeed incurred by the organization, and hence they affect the objective function.
3.7.2 Costs and Uncertainty
Using IT project data confidentially obtained from a Fortune 50 company, we build a distri-
bution of estimated project costs. It is easy to see that the distribution is far from normal;
indeed, we can fit an exponential distribution with a high degree of accuracy. In the chart
below, the histogram describes the distribution of project costs (in millions of US dollars),
while the curve shows an exponential distribution with mean 4.
Based on this data, we generate a base estimated cost for projects by random draws
from an exponential distribution. (For robustness, we run simulations with different distri-
bution means, but choose values close to 4.) However, the cost of building a project is not
constant and state-independent; it clearly depends on the other capabilities of the organi-
zation. For example, investments in certain infrastructure projects may subsequently ease
the development of other projects, reducing their costs. Further, cost estimates are rarely
accurate; indeed, IT projects typically run over budget, by a factor of up to 3 (Standish
group, 1994). Therefore, to generate the investment / cost required for a project p from a
given state, we multiply the base estimated cost for project p (drawn from the distribution)
with a transition-specific multiplier drawn from a uniform distribution with the range 1 to
3.1
Finally, we have to account for cost uncertainty. We model cost uncertainty as a real
number between 0 and 1. At the extreme low value of 0, we assume that there is no uncer-
tainty, and the initial base cost and transition-specific multipliers are completely accurate
1As a consequence, the cost of building a project varies depending on the current state, but the cost of
building the same project from different states are similar.
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Figure 3.2: Exponential distribution for IT project costs
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and never change. At the other extreme of 1, we assume infinite uncertainty, implying that
the base cost and multipliers for future states are completely inaccurate. At an uncertainty
u between 0 and 1, we treat estimates as being partially accurate; the cost for a transition
one time step in the future is given by (1-u) times the current cost estimate + u times a new
estimate drawn from the appropriate distributions (both the base cost and transition-specific
multipliers are re-drawn). Realistic values for uncertainty are between 0 and 1, with De-
fenders having very low uncertainty, and Prospectors facing considerably higher uncertainty
(Miles et al., 1978).
We generate values using a similar process, also based on fitting an exponential distribu-
tion to data from the same Fortune 50 company, and accounting for uncertainty.
3.7.3 Project Failures and Risk
As discussed in Section 3.5, IT investments have uncertain outcomes; they may succeed,
helping to build a new capability, or fail, leaving the organization in the same state. The
failure probabilities can be surprisingly high; various studies have estimated such cancella-
tion / abandonment probabilities as between 15 and 25%, and possibly ranging as high as
40% (El Emam and Koru, 2008; Jones, 1998; Sonnekus and Labuschagne, 2004; Sauer and
Cuthbertson, 2003). A key difference between Prospectors and Defenders is their tolerance
towards such risk; as discussed in the previous section, Defenders tend to select projects
with considerably lower failure rates, while Prospectors may invest in projects with higher
risk.
To generate appropriate failure probabilities for our simulation, we consider the two
different rules for project selection described in Section 3.6; Prospectors try to maximize ex-
pected return, while Defenders maximize risk-adjusted expected return. Failure probabilities
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Figure 3.3: Risk-return tradeoffs for Defenders and Prospectors
and return values were generated randomly for a large number of projects. In Figure 3.3, the
blue projects (near the top left) are those considered by both types of organizations. The
orange projects are those chosen by only the Prospector, while the red projects are those
chosen only by the Defender. The black projects are the remaining projects, which tend to
have higher risk and lower return.
Examining the failure probabilities selected by the two types of organizations, we see
that normal distributions are a good fit to the empirical distributions; the projects selected
by Prospectors had failure probabilities approximating a normal distribution with mean
0.19 and standard deviation 0.07 (See Figure 3.4 below), while the projects selected by
Defenders had failure probabilities approximating a normal distribution with mean 0.08 and
standard deviation 0.03. These distributions for Prospectors are a good match to the failure
probabilities reported in the literature (discussed above), while those for the Defender (as
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Figure 3.4: Histogram of failure probabilities for a Prospector; these can be modeled with a
normal distribution
expected) are considerably lower (See Figure 3.5).
Markov decision processes can model such stochastic transitions in our simulations. We
assume that each project has a failure probability, generated by a random draw from an
appropriate distribution. (For robustness, we run repeated simulations with different means
and standard deviations for the distributions, but choose parameter values close to those
identified above.) If the organization invests in a project, it fails with the corresponding
probability, leaving the state unchanged. If the project succeeds, the organization moves to
a new state.
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Figure 3.5: Histogram of failure probabilities for a Defender; these can be modeled with a
normal distribution
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3.7.4 Horizons and Planning
Before we describe how the simulation works with a specific planning horizon, it is important
to distinguish the horizon h from the length of the planning period L. An organization may
be involved in planning to achieve a future goal; for instance, it may have a 5-year goal of
wishing to be recognized as the IT leader in its industry sector. Thus, the effectiveness of
their planning is to be evaluated at the end of this period (i.e. after L time units). However,
this does not mean that the organization has a planning horizon of 5 years or L time units;
it may make concrete plans only over a shorter horizon of h time units ahead (such as 2
years). For consistency in evaluation, we try different planning horizons, but evaluate the
effectiveness of all plans at the end of the same L time units.
To find the effect of the length of the planning horizon on the plan effectiveness, we choose
a horizon h, and compute a plan P (h) using the following procedure. From the start state,
the planning algorithm considers all possible paths of length h, corresponding to all possible
sets of actions it could take up to h time units into the future. (Note that the outcomes for
any action or set of actions are non-deterministic; from the start state, if the organization
invests in a project, it may succeed, moving to a new state, or fail, remaining in the start
state.) The algorithm considers the expected net value of every set of actions, and chooses
the first investment that is likely to maximize the expected net value. The organization then
makes this investment, moving to a new state (or possibly remaining in the same state). It
then makes / obtains revised estimates of the costs and values of future actions and states.
Then, from the current state, the organization again considers all sets of actions up to h
time units into the future, and makes the corresponding investment. This continues for a
total of L time units, when the simulation is stopped at the end of the planning period. At
this point, the net value NV (h) from this plan P (h) is determined by subtracting the total
cost of all investments from the value of all completed capabilities.
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We can describe this process formally by representing each planning horizon as a different
policy for the Markov Decision Process (Ross, 1983). This requires some mathematical
notation. Let Vj(S) denote the value that can be obtained from state S, if the plan lasts for
j additional time units. Let Vj(S, a) represent the value from state S if the plan lasts for j
additional time units, and the organization takes action a. Clearly, we have:
∀j ≥ 1, Vj(S) = max
a
{Vj(S, a) = E[Vj−1(S ′)− c(a)]}
where E[·] denotes the expectation taken over the states S ′ which can be reached from
S by taking action a.






We can now define the policy: If the current state is S and the current time is i, the
policy pih picks the action a∗ = arg maxa{Vmin(h,T−i)(S, a)}. That is, pih represents the policy
where we use a planning horizon of h time units.
It is important to note that in the absence of any uncertainty, longer planning horizons
would lead to more value. However, the presence of uncertainty means that each policy
pih is working with an inaccurate estimate of future costs and values. Further, the exact
uncertainty in these costs and values is unknown to the algorithm. After each time step,
when the algorithm makes an action, it moves to a new state and obtains a new estimate
of the value of each future state, and the cost of making each action from possible future
states.
We repeat this process for each possible policy pih corresponding to each horizon h (from
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1 to L), and compare the net values for each horizon. To ensure robustness of our results, we
repeat the simulation a large number (n) of times for each horizon, generating new random
costs, values, and failure probabilities each time. For consistency, each horizon is compared
on the same n inputs, corresponding to the same costs, values and failure probabilities.
3.8 Results
We now describe the results of our computational studies for Defenders and Prospectors.
The result of each simulation is shown in a graph.
In our first simulation, there were 12 projects which were needed to build 5 capabilities.
A planning period of 11 was used. The cost and value uncertainty were each set to 0.05.
A mean failure probability of 0.08 was used. This represents a Defender’s profile. The Net
value was computed for different planning horizons from 1 to 11. We see from the figure
below that the Net value increases with an increase in the planning horizon. This supports
our hypothesis that in low-uncertainty situations, long planning horizons are more effective.
In contrast, as uncertainty increases, shorter planning horizons become more effective.
Our second simulation uses identical parameters, except for the cost and value uncertainties
(each set to 0.5) and the failure probability (normally distributed with a mean of 0.2 and a
standard deviation of 0.08). We see that as the horizon length increases, the effectiveness of
the plan decreases, meaning that shorter horizons are more effective.
These results are consistent across different values of the input parameters. The graph
below corresponds to a simulation in which 13 projects build 5 capabilities, and the plan
length is 12. Again, the mean failure probability is 0.08 (with a standard deviation of 0.03),
and the cost and value uncertainties are set to 0.09 respectively. Again, this corresponds to
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Figure 3.6: Impact of planning horizon on effectiveness 1 - Defender
the profile of a Defender, and we observe that longer planning horizons yield more effective
results.
We consider another example of a Prospector, with 14 projects building 6 capabilities,
and a planning period of 12. Here, value uncertainty is set to 0.55 and cost uncertainty to
0.6. We use normally distributed failure probabilities with mean 0.19 and standard deviation
of 0.08. Again, we observe the trend of shorter planning horizons being more effective.
In our final example of a Prospector, we have 13 projects which together build 6 capa-
bilities. The length of the planning period is 12, and the mean failure probability is 0.019.
At cost uncertainty 0.55 and value uncertainty 0.45, we observe again that short planning
horizons give better results.
We also consider how the extent of cost and value uncertainty affect the impact of plan-
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Figure 3.7: Impact of planning horizon on effectiveness 2 - Prospector
ning horizon on plan effectiveness. To do this, we vary the uncertainty used in the simulation,
keeping all other input parameters fixed. In Figure 3.11, we see the effect of varying the
uncertainty. In these simulations, 11 projects can build 4 capabilities, with a plan length of
9. To isolate the effect of uncertainty, we set all failure probabilities to 0. The cost uncertain-
ties we used are 0, 0.05 and 0.1, while the value uncertainties are 0, 0, and 0.1 respectively.
The figure clearly shows that as the uncertainty increases, the benefit from longer planning
horizons decreases. That is, long planning horizons are most beneficial when the uncertainty
is low.
For completeness, we also run our simulations on inputs representing organizations op-
erating in low risk and high uncertainty environments, and high risk / low uncertainty
environments. In the simulation below, we use a low risk, and high cost and value uncer-
tainty. There are 11 projects building 4 capabilities, and a planning period of 9. The cost
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Figure 3.8: Impact of planning horizon on effectiveness 3 - Defender
uncertainty is set to 0.5 and value uncertainty is set to 0.5. We use normally distributed
failure probabilities with mean 0.07 and standard deviation of 0.03. Such an organization is
neither a Defender nor a Prospector, and the impact of planning horizon on plan effective-
ness is not predicted by our hypotheses; we run such simulations to establish robustness of
our computational framework. We do not observe a clear trend in the results; the shortest
planning horizon is most effective, but subsequently, effectiveness seems to increase with the
planning horizon.
We also consider organizations operating in high risk, but low uncertainty environments.
Again, these correspond to neither Defenders or Prospectors; we run this simulation to
test our computational approach. In the simulation below, we used 11 projects building
4 capabilities, and a planning period of 9. The cost uncertainty is set to 0.02 and value
uncertainty is set to 0.02. We use normally distributed failure probabilities with mean 0.25
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Figure 3.9: Impact of planning horizon on effectiveness 4 - Prospector
and standard deviation of 0.1. In this case, we observe the trend of longer planning horizons
being more effective.
Finally, capturing a more realistic scenario, we consider intermediate values of uncer-
tainty and risk. Such organizations are between Defenders and Prospectors and have been
described as Analyzers (Miles and Snow, 1978). We run our model with intermediate risk
and uncertainty for these organizations, using 12 projects building 5 capabilities, and a plan-
ning period of 10. The cost uncertainty is set to 0.25 and value uncertainty is set to 0.25.
We use normally distributed failure probabilities with mean 0.16 and standard deviation of
0.065. Interestingly, we observe that intermediate planning horizons are most effective for
these organizations.
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Figure 3.10: Impact of planning horizon on effectiveness 5 - Prospector
Figure 3.11: Impact of planning horizon on effectiveness with varying levels of uncertainty
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Figure 3.12: Impact of planning horizon on effectiveness - Low risk, High uncertainty
3.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed a mathematical framework to model the Information Systems
planning process. We described the use of Markov decision processes to model IS planning,
and several advantages of this method, which captures important features of Information
Systems planning. With this modeling framework in place, we can perform simulations with
varying input parameters, and thereby understand the consequences of decisions adopted by
IT managers, or of various planning dimensions.
We also studied the effect of the length of planning horizon on the plan effectiveness for
two types of of organizations, Prospectors and Defenders. Our results support our hypothe-
ses, showing that Defenders, who operate in stable market domains, benefit more from longer
planning horizons. On the other hand, Prospectors, who operate in dynamic environments,
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Figure 3.13: Impact of planning horizon on effectiveness - High risk, Low uncertainty
benefit more from shorter planning horizons. These results have important managerial impli-
cations, suggesting that managers operating in dynamic environments should adopt shorter
planning horizons to take advantage of new situations as they arise, instead of making in-
vestments that will only give them long-term benefits which may never be realized. Newkirk
et al. (2008) found that, contrary to their expectations, managers in organizations facing
uncertainty do not typically use shorter IS planning horizons; our work provides evidence
that adopting such shorter horizons could lead to more effective plans.
An interesting direction for future research could be to extend our simulation method
by adding more features and more detailed models of the environment, or other forms of
uncertainty. Future work can also examine other dimensions of planning, and observe how
they affect plan effectiveness. For example, comprehensiveness refers to the extent to which
various alternatives are considered and explored; it would be interesting to determine how
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Figure 3.14: Impact of planning horizon on effectiveness - Analyzer (Intermediate risk and
uncertainty)
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much comprehensiveness can improve the effectiveness of plans, and whether firms should
adopt a “satisficing” approach instead of attempting to be perfectly comprehensive. Fur-
ther, the appropriate extent of comprehensiveness may differ for organizations with different
strategy profiles. Adaptability or flexibility of plans to react to changing circumstances could
be another interesting dimension to consider.
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Chapter 4
Learning and Information Systems
Planning
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we considered the Information Systems (IS) planning process of
organizations, and developed a formal mathematical model of planning. However, we as-
sumed that the planning process was static, in the sense that the process and fundamental
objectives did not change over time. Of course, planning decisions might be modified and
plans might change in response to new information or altered circumstances, but the process
itself was unchanged. We now consider incorporating learning into a planning system, and
explicitly modeling it in ways that can even change the organization’s core objectives.
Learning, or the ability to improve over time, has long been identified as a key capability
of a planning system, and an important dimension to measure the effectiveness of Information
Systems planning (Shrivastava and Grant, 1985; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1987). IS
planning systems which do not incorporate learning have less flexibility to adapt and respond
to imperfect planning decisions or changes in the environment (Pyburn, 1983; Vitale et al.,
1986; Ciborra, 1994). In contrast, IS planning processes which emphasize learning are more
successful, and prove beneficial to the organization (Henderson and Sifonis, 1988; Huysman
et al., 1994). Organizations which learn and incorporate such learning into their planning
process improve both their planning system and planning outcomes, leading to more effective
plans (Grover and Segars, 2005).
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In this chapter, we first discuss organizational learning, and based on prior theoretical
work, we develop the useful definition that learning involves first inference and then action
to improve effectiveness. We then consider learning in the Information Systems planning
context, and the extensive research that suggests it is one of the most important components
of planning. Further, based on empirical data on IT projects obtained from a leading Fortune
50 company, we demonstrate that an inductive approach can enable the company to draw
useful inferences; the data is also suggestive of the fact that the organization indeed acts on
these inferences. Thus, as learning is important in both theory and practice, any model of
the planning process must incorporate learning.
The aspect of learning that we focus on is double-loop learning (Argyris, 1976; Argyris
and Scho¨n, 1978), and our first theoretical contribution is extending double-loop learning to
the IS planning context. In particular, using the organizational strategy typology of Miles
and Snow (1978), we draw on the principal-agent research literature (Berle and Means 1932;
Jensen and Meckling 1976; Ho¨lmstrom 1979; Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985; Arrow 1985, etc.)
to demonstrate how IT leaders at an organization may make planning decisions that do
not match the organization’s strategy profile, particularly in the context of risk tolerance.
We then describe how double-loop learning can be applied to ensure that the organization’s
objective in use aligns with the espoused objective that matches its strategy profile.
We then attempt to study the benefit from double-loop learning, and how this can be
affected by the organization’s strategy profile; we also focus on the correlation between
risk and return of potential IT investments that the organization can make. We analyse
these effects theoretically, and validate our hypotheses using the computational model of the
planning process developed in the previous chapter; this required extending the model to
explicitly incorporate double-loop learning. This extended computational model also permits
us to examine how the benefit from double-loop learning varies depending on the time of
learning; as one might expect, sophisticated learners, which learn very rapidly, derive more
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benefit from their learning process than naive learners, which take a relatively long time to
learn, and hence have a shorter period over which to reap the benefits from learning.
4.2 Learning in Organizations
4.2.1 Learning and Adaptability in Information Systems
Planning
What is learning?
There has been a lack of consensus on a clear definition for learning in the organizational
context. However, there is broad agreement on some important aspects of learning. Learning
or adaptation has been described as the process by which an organization adjusts to its
environment (Fiol and Lyles, 1985). In particular, it is widely agreed that learning is an
intentional process, with the aim of improving effectiveness (Dodgson, 1993; Huber, 1991;
Levitt and March, 1988). This suggests that there are two important components of learning:
First, a gain in knowledge or understanding, and second, an action taken in response to this
change. Fiol and Lyles (1985) refer to the first of these as Cognitive development, and
the second as Behavior Development; therefore, they define Organizational Learning as the
process of improving actions through better knowledge and understanding. Similarly, Daft
and Weick (1984) suggest that learning involves interpretation followed by action. A related
concept is discussed by Argyris and Scho¨n (1978), who refer to learning as involving both
the detection and correction of errors.
Both these components of learning are important in the organizational context. If a
firm takes an action that improves effectiveness without an understanding of the cause of
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this change, or why this action was helpful, this limited understanding may prevent the
firm from reaping the full benefits of the action. For instance, if the internal or external
environment changes, and this action no longer improves effectiveness, the firm may not
know how to respond. In general, action taken without understanding prevents generalizing
or replicating similar effectiveness gains in other situations. On the other hand, cognitive
development which results in the firm learning how to improve performance, is unlikely
to last long if the firm does not incorporate this understanding into a behavioral change:
The considerable literature on experiential learning (Huysman et al., 1994; March, 1988;
Levitt and March, 1988; March and Olsen, 1975 etc.) argues that organizational learning
only occurs when the cognitive inferences are encoded into the firm’s routines which guide
behavior. If this encoding into organizational practices and routines which guide behavior
does not occur, individuals in the firm might learn, but the organization as a whole does not
(Argyris and Scho¨n, 1978). Sammon et al. (1984) similarly argue that learning is explicitly
directed at improving effectiveness, while Argyris and Scho¨n (1978), and Fiol and Lyles
(1985) claim that learning has not happened if effectiveness has not increased.
We therefore conclude that learning involves inference, followed by intentional change to
produce improved effectiveness.
What is learning in the context of Information Systems Planning?
Organizational learning is widely recognized as a central component of Information Systems
planning, due to the fact that a strategic IS planning process that emphasizes learning will
lead to more effective planning and prove beneficial to the organization (Huysman et al.,
1994; Henderson and Sifonis, 1988; Grover and Segars, 2005). Two broad approaches to IS
planning have been considered in the literature: The first is a more formal / rational or
comprehensive and top-down approach, while the second is more incremental and adaptable
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(Raghunathan and Raghunathan, 1994). Salmela and Spil (2002) argue that while early re-
search on IS Planning suggested that organizations should adopt a formal and comprehensive
planning process, it was later recognized that this may lead to an overly-top down approach
without room for learning and flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances (Pyburn, 1983;
Vitale et al., 1986; Ciborra, 1994).
Organizations benefit from adopting elements of both these approaches. Grover and
Segars (2005) argue that the most effective planning profiles have high rationality / compre-
hensiveness and high adaptability (see also Segars et al., 1998). Adaptability refers to the ca-
pability of the planning system to learn (Lederer and Sethi, 1996; Sabherwal and King, 1995).
Planning systems should have in-built flexibility to allow for adaptation (Raghunathan and
Raghunathan, 1994). Organizational learning obtained from experience in planning results
in improved abilities to adapt to unanticipated changes, both within the organization and
in the external environment (Segars and Grover, 1999).
Raghunathan and Raghunathan (1994) argue for the importance of an improvement-
oriented IS planning system, and evaluate planning systems primarily in terms of improve-
ment over a period of time (see also King and Srinivasan, 1983). This perspective is shared by
Ramanujam and Venkatraman (1987), who claim that an effective planning system should
improve over time, or learn. These changes made through learning improve not just the
planning system, but planning outcomes (Grover and Segars, 2005).
4.2.2 Are Organizations Learning ?
As discussed above, prior work (both in the IS planning and general strategic management
context) has shown that if organizations learn and incorporate learning into planning, they
can improve their performance (Grover and Segars, 2005). However, we have not consid-
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ered the question of how organizations learn, whether learning is feasible, or whether such
learning in fact occurs within organizations. In the rest of this section, we demonstrate that
organizations actually can and do learn.
We define learning as inference, followed by intentional change to produce improved effec-
tiveness. In order to show that both inference and subsequent improvements to effectiveness
are possible in the Information Systems context, we use IT project data from a Fortune
50 company. Our dataset consists of 88 IT projects being implemented by the company
in a single quarter. For each project we have data on performance attributes including
implementation cost (compared to budget), time required (compared to initial estimates),
and the scope. Based on evaluations and input from senior IT leaders at the firm, a single
performance variable was computed for each project, indicating whether the project was
underperforming or performing as expected. IT leaders also evaluated each project on other
measures, including complexity-related attributes (such as Coordination Complexity, Tool
use complexity, Transactional complexity), project size and value, need for resources ex-
ternal to the organization, extent of the change in business processes required, and several
additional dimensions.
Inductive learning can be used to identify patterns in such IT project data. The organiza-
tion can identify those patterns in project attributes which lead to project underperformance.
Based on these patterns, the organization can draw inferences about the causes for project
underperformance. These inferences form the first step (cognitive development) of learning.
For the Fortune 50 company described above, we build a decision tree to identify patterns in
its IT project data. To generate the tree, we use the C 4.5 algorithm included in the WEKA
data mining library (Hall et al., 2009). The decision tree we generate shows that clear
patterns exist showing attributes leading to project underperformance. In Figure 4.1 repre-
senting the decision tree below, red leaves (circles) correspond to underperforming projects,
while green leaves (rectangles) denote projects that are performing as expected.
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Figure 4.1: Decision Tree
From the tree above, we observe the following examples of patterns in project attributes
which are associated with poor performance:
1. Coordination Complexity = High AND Business Process Change = Medium
2. Coordination Complexity = High AND Business Process Change = Low AND Trans-
actional Complexity = High AND Initiative Size =Small
The patterns above demonstrate that the organization can meaningfully draw inferences
about or identify causes of project underperformance. Are these inferences useful? Do they
result in changes leading to improved effectiveness (behavioral development)? To answer
these questions, we look at the organization’s project data in the subsequent quarter to
see if the organization acted on these inferences and made intentional changes to improve
performance.
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The first pattern we identified was that projects with high coordination complexity and
which exerted a medium business process change tended to perform poorly. In the first
quarter, six projects matched this pattern; of these, five performed poorly. However, in
the second quarter only three out of these six underperformed. The success rate increased
from 16.67% to 50%. Similarly, the second pattern we identified was that projects with
high Coordination Complexity and low Business Process Change and high Transactional
Complexity and small Initiative size underperformed. In the first quarter, all the projects
matching this pattern performed poorly, but in the second quarter, two-thirds of these
performed well.
This increase in the project success rate in the subsequent quarter is presumably due
to changes that the organization is making to obtain improved effectiveness. This suggests
that the organization is indeed learning.
4.3 Double Loop Learning
As we have argued, learning can be understood as inference, followed by intentional change
to improve effectiveness. However, a distinction can be made between two forms of learning:
Single-loop and Double-loop learning (Argyris, 1976). Single-loop learning involves improv-
ing the process of achieving a goal; that is, it primarily detects and corrects errors of process.
Double-loop learning involves examining the goal which is to be achieved, and modifying the
goal if necessary; that is, it detects and corrects errors in the choice of what is to be done.
As an example, due originally to Argyris (1977b,a), consider a hypothetically intelligent
thermostat that is set to achieve a desired temperature, such as 70 degrees. In this case,
single-loop learning would involve the thermostat measuring the current temperature, com-
paring it to the desired temperature, and increasing or decreasing the heat level to ensure
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that the desired temperature is reached efficiently. However, if the thermostat were intelli-
gent enough to question whether the temperature should be 70 degrees, and possibly change
this ‘goal’, it would be performing double-loop learning. Such a ‘smart thermostat’ illus-
trates the value of double-loop learning; for example, it may turn off the heating system in
a home when no people are present, and turn it back on before they arrive. Indeed, such
smart thermostats are in high demand; the most prominent manufacturer, Nest, which was
recently acquired for three billion dollars, sells its thermostat for $250, considerably more
than the price of competing ‘simple’ thermostats (that perform single-loop learning).
The example above illustrates the potential value of double-loop learning (in a simple
context), but why is it necessary? What causes “double-loop errors”, i.e., errors in the choice
of goals? One reason why goals may be ‘incorrectly’ chosen is because of the difference
between Espoused Theories and Theories in Use. According to Argyris and Scho¨n (1978),
all human or organizational actions are based on theories in action. Espoused theories are
those that are reported as the basis for actions whereas theories in use are those that are the
true basis for actions. Discrepancies between these may result in choosing a goal based on
the theory in use, even when this goal is different from one that would be chosen based on
an ideal espoused theory. Double-loop learning, which involves the process of questioning a
goal, can be of benefit when there is a difference between an espoused theory and the theory
in use. In this setting, the double-loop learning can identify the cause of the discrepancy
and change the goal if necessary.
These ideas have also been applied to organizational learning (Argyris, 1976, 1977b,a),
and we extend them further to Information Systems planning, where this problem is preva-
lent: Brown (2010) conducted surveys and interviews of senior IT planners / leaders, in
which considerable differences were revealed between espoused beliefs about IT planning
and organizational practice. This gap between ideals and practices has been referred to as
the strategic information systems planners’ paradox (Lederer and Sethi, 1996). Recall that
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in IS planning, the organization chooses a goal state, consisting of a set of capabilities that
it wishes to possess, and invests in projects to build these capabilities. The choice of this
goal state is based on organizational business objectives. We define the espoused objective
as the objective that IT planners hold as ideal, or claim to use in choosing the organizational
IT goal. Objectives in use are those that IT planners actually use while making IT plan-
ning decisions and choosing their goal. In this context, single-loop learning may involve IT
leaders finding more effective ways to reach a goal. On the other hand, double-loop learning
involves the IT leaders questioning their choice of goal in light of their espoused objective,
and choosing a new goal if the current goal is not in line with their espoused objective.
In this chapter, we are interested in studying benefits from double loop learning, and what
factors influence these. In particular we use the Miles and Snow (1978) typology of organi-
zational strategy type, comparing firms which are Prospectors and Defenders. These organi-
zations operate in different environments and have different espoused objectives, specifically
in their tolerance for risk. However, the objectives in use by IT leaders may differ from
these espoused objectives. One prominent reason for the different risk appetite between an
organization’s espoused objective and the objective in use by managers is given by agency
theory, and the principal-agent problem (Berle and Means, 1932; Eisenhardt, 1989; Arrow,
1985, etc.).
Principal-agent problems arise from a difference between the objectives and interests of
a principal (in this case, the organization itself, or its shareholders) and an agent (the man-
agers) hired to further the interests of the principal. This problem was first posed by Berle
and Means (1932), who argued that the separation between ownership (by the shareholders)
and control (by the managers) of an organization frequently produces conditions where the
interests of the organization and its managers diverge; the problem can also be formulated
mathematically (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1985; Arrow, 1985; Levinthal, 1988). Managers, as
individuals, tend to be inherently more risk-averse than a large organization or a collection
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of shareholders; while an organization may be willing to make several investments, some
of which have a reasonably high probability of failure, managers in charge of one or a few
projects may be unwilling to accept responsibility for a project which is likely to fail. In
the Information Systems context in particular, where IT project risks are higher than for
other forms of capital investment (Dewan et al., 2007), such concerns are likely to be partic-
ularly relevant when making IS planning decisions. Typically, the solution to dealing with
this discrepancy involves performance-based incentives for managers to align their interests
with that of the organization. However, the incentive-based payments or fees suggested by
economic theory tend to be very complex, and not used in practice (Arrow, 1985; Mahoney,
2005). Incentive-based payments used in practice are simpler, and hence provide imperfect
alignments, potentially leaving managers with an incentive to adopt a different risk appetite
than that espoused by the organization. Therefore, when making IS planning decisions, IT
leaders may choose to invest in projects or capabilities that involve a level of risk which may
be different from that which is appropriate for the organization’s strategy profile.
We argue below that when making IS planning decisions, firms which use an objective /
risk appetite different from the espoused objective for their strategy type may benefit from
double-loop learning. We attempt to understand which strategy type can benefit more from
double-loop learning, and how other factors such as the timing of double-loop learning, and
the correlation between IT project risks and returns can affect these benefits.
4.4 Literature Review
Our contributions in this chapter are related to many different facets of the considerable
literature in organizational learning, information systems planning, and related areas. We
consider some of the most relevant strands of existing research in these fields, and survey
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the important prior contributions of each area in turn.
4.4.1 Organizational Learning
As described in Section 2.1, there has been a very large body of work on organizational
learning. Indeed, learning within organizations has been a key feature of the understanding
of firms since the influential work of Cyert and March (1963), and learning, in the sense of
adapting to environmental changes, has been identified as the essence of Strategic Manage-
ment (Chakravarthy, 1982). Different authors adopt a myriad of definitions and perspectives,
but there is some consensus on several key characteristics of organizational learning. It has
been described as the ways in which firms build, enhance and organize their knowledge
and routines, and develop increased efficiency by improving the skills of their workforce
(Dodgson, 1993). There is widespread agreement that learning involves better knowledge
and understanding, leading to improved actions: Fiol and Lyles (1985) refer to the former
as cognitive development, and the latter as behavior development. Daft and Weick (1984)
refer to these phases respectively as interpretation and action; similarly, Argyris and Scho¨n
(1978) use the terminology of detection and correction of errors.
Detecting errors involves first measuring the error, which can be defined as the difference
between the desired performance and actual performance of the organization. Once the
cause of the error has been identified, the organization can apply feedback, or make appro-
priate changes to improve performance. This suggests that in the organizational context,
firms primarily learn by doing, by evaluating their successes and failures (Sambamurthy,
Bharadwaj and Grover 2003). A similar argument was made by Shrivastava (1983), who
describes learning as involving “the institutionalization of experience within the organiza-
tion”. In fact, there is a large body of work on experiential learning (Huysman et al., 1994;
March, 1988; Levitt and March, 1988; March and Olsen, 1975) which posits that learning
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occurs when inferences (from experiences) are institutionalized or incorporated into routines
guiding the firm’s behavior. Learning, involving changes to the firm’s behavior and routines,
is commonly understood to have an implicit or even explicit goal of improving performance
and effectiveness (Levitt and March, 1988; Huber, 1991; Dodgson, 1993; Sammon et al.,
1984; Argyris and Scho¨n, 1978; Fiol and Lyles, 1985).
This literature underlies our definition of learning as involving inference, followed by
action to improve effectiveness.
4.4.2 Learning and Information Systems Planning
Learning also plays an important role in Information Systems, and particularly in the context
of IS planning. Huysman et al. (1994) propose an organizational learning perspective on the
entire process of Information Systems planning, and argue that it should be regarded as a
central component of this process; they argue that previous approaches (in which IS planning
is an excessively formal or rational process, involving deterministically formulating an IT
policy based on business needs and goals, then constructing an information architecture
and technical architecture, defining and prioritizing projects to achieve this goal) ignore the
complexities of real organizational situations. Such formal approaches do not leave enough
room for experimentation and innovation, and modifying plans in response to intermediate
outcomes and new information. Many other papers have made similar distinctions between
an extremely formal and comprehensive / top-down approach to IS planning, and a more
incremental, flexible, and adaptable approach that emphasizes learning; while the former
approach was initially popular, the latter has gained increasing attention as the complexities
in IS planning have become more obvious (Pyburn, 1983; Vitale et al., 1986; Ciborra, 1994;
Raghunathan and Raghunathan, 1994; Salmela and Spil, 2002). Segars and Grover (1998)
argue that the most effective IS planning systems involve both elements of the rational
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approach and the adaptation / learning-centric approach; similar conclusions were reached
by the same authors in (Segars et al., 1998). Providing more evidence for this view is the fact
that successfully implementing strategic IS plans has been identified as a key difficulty of IS
planning, and Newkirk et al. (2003) find that excessive comprehensiveness in implementation
planning can lead to worse outcomes; leaving more room for adaptability in this area could
lead to more success.
Grover and Segars (2005) argue that IS planning systems evolve as a learning system.
Their thesis is that not just plans, but even planning systems evolve over time in response to
environmental and organizational changes; the process characteristics of an organization’s
IS planning will change over time to be more effective. Supporting this idea, King and Teo
(1997) find that IS planning systems evolve over time, and their effectiveness (measured
in terms of alignment of IS strategy and business strategy) increases. (Note that we can
draw an interesting parallel to double-loop learning, in which the objective, a key feature of
the planning system as opposed to a plan, changes over time.) Similarly, Venkatraman and
Ramanujam (1987) and Raghunathan and Raghunathan (1994) adopt the improvement of
IS planning capabilities over time as a measure of planning system success.
The literature summarized briefly above describes the importance of learning as a key
component of IS planning, but does not address the source of this learning. Robey et al.
(2000), in a review of contemporary research on Information Technology and organizational
learning, identify experience as the key way in which organizations learn to deploy and
implement IT capabilities effectively. This view is supported by case studies by several
researchers of IT systems at a range of different organizations in multiple countries (Caron
et al., 1994; Yetton et al., 1994; Robey and Newman, 1996; Ang et al., 1997).
90
IT Project Failures, Risk and Learning
As described above, developing plans for implementation of IT projects is one of the most
challenging issues in IS planning. An important reason for this is the high failure rate of IT
projects; Dewan et al. (2007) find that the risk involved in IT investments is considerably
higher than the risk faced by non-IT capital investments of firms. IT projects frequently
fail, at considerable cost to the organization. Various surveys by the Standish Group have
found project failure rates between 15% and 40% (El Emam and Koru, 2008); Jones (1998)
found failure rates as high as 19% in the controlled world of US military IT projects, and
24% in other IT projects. Sauer and Cuthbertson (2003) find a failure rate of “only” 9% in
a survey of IT projects at firms in the United Kingdom, while Sonnekus and Labuschagne
(2004) find 22% of South African projects failing. Certain classes of IT investments involve
even high probability of failure than others; Hitt et al. (2002) focus on ERP systems, which
they describe as “unusually difficult”; they provide numerous references to case studies of
organizations which face considerable financial difficulty (and even bankruptcy) as a result
of failed projects, with as many as 90% of ERP projects reported as running late or over
budget (see also Davenport, 1998).
Lyytinen and Robey (1999) also consider the high risk of IT project failure; they argue
that this risk is intimately connected with a failure of organizational learning, and that
increased learning can lead to better outcomes. As much learning is experiential, IT failures
can facilitate future learning: Sambamurthy et al. (2003) claim that organizations learn
from failure; similarly, El Emam and Koru (2008) suggest that failed projects can lead
to considerable learning. Huysman et al. (1994) even go so far as to argue that failure
of IT projects should be part of a firm’s plan, as the experience gained is a benefit to
the organization. Indeed, a key premise of all inductive learning is that both successes
and failures (positive and negative examples) are required to identify patterns that lead to
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success. Given the complexities of Information Systems management and the unavoidability
of some risk, it can be argued that the most successful organizations are not those which
completely avoid failure, but those which learn from their failures.
4.4.3 Double Loop Learning
The concept of Double-Loop learning, as discussed in Section 3, was introduced by Argyris
(1976). and expanded on in a series of papers and books, both individually and with Donald
Scho¨n (Argyris and Scho¨n, 1974; Argyris, 1977b,a; Argyris and Scho¨n, 1978). Besides draw-
ing the distinction between single-loop and double-loop learning, these works introduce the
concept of espoused theories and (possibly different) theories of action. We have summarized
these papers above (see Section 4.3), and so focus here primarily on other contributions in
this area. Brown (2010) conducted a survey of senior IS planners (CIOs, IT Directors and
senior managers) at South African firms, and found a difference between espoused beliefs
and actual practices. He argues that the existence of this gap suggests that learning can
take place, but did not attempt to examine whether organizations engaged in double-loop
learning. Chaston et al. (2001) conducted a much larger survey of small UK manufacturing
firms and explicitly tried to determine the extent of double-loop or higher-order learning;
they found that entrepreneurial firms are more likely to engage in such learning than non-
entrepreneurial firms.
Henderson (1997) asked the question of whether double-loop learning generates reliable
knowledge for organizations. Later, with Blackman and Connelly (2004), he took a theoret-
ical and epistemological approach and hypothesized that it may create mistakes or fail to
identify promising directions. In contrast, McElroy (1999) takes a practitioner’s perspective
and suggests methods to measure the return on investment from investing in knowledge
management and double-loop learning, claiming that only double-loop learning helps orga-
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nizations increase their rates of innovation. Firestone and McElroy (2003), also argue that
problems can arise out of a decision-execution cycle that cannot be solved by single-loop
learning, but require double-loop techniques. Nonaka (1994) considers the question of how
knowledge is created by organizations; he claims that in contrast to prior work which asserts
that double-loop learning is very difficult and requires considerable organizational effort, it
can be a daily activity for the organization that is not a separate, challenging task.
4.5 The Benefit from Double Loop Learning
4.5.1 Prospectors and Defenders
We use the (Miles and Snow, 1978) typology to classify organizations as either Prospectors
or Defenders. Recall that Prospectors operate in dynamic, high-uncertainty environments,
and must frequently deal with changing circumstances. It is expected that IT investments
will frequently fail, but Prospectors do not seek to eliminate this risk. Instead, they should
be willing to take on risk if it results in increased expected return. Thus, the espoused
objective for a Prospector is simply expected return.
However, IT leaders at a firm with the Prospector profile may not use their espoused
objective when making planning decisions. It is human nature to be risk-averse, and man-
agers are not immune to this tendency. Managers may wish to avoid being associated with
risky projects that have a high likelihood of failure, as they may perceive such failures as
negatively impacting their careers. Thus, though they may pay attention to the expected
returns from IT projects, these returns may be discounted by perceived risk. In other words,
managers may have an objective in use of risk-adjusted expected return.
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Defenders, on the other hand, operate in relatively stable environments, with low uncer-
tainty. Defenders rarely make major technological changes and usually operate in narrow
and stable markets (Delery and Doty, 1996; Sabherwal and Chan, 2001). They focus on
operational efficiency and hence prefer to avoid risky projects with a high chance of failure;
rather, they invest in frequent incremental improvements each of which is likely to suc-
ceed. Therefore, Defenders are more risk-averse compared to Prospectors. Typically, their
espoused objective is risk-adjusted expected return.
While making planning decisions, IT leaders may not use this espoused objective. Man-
agers may be willing to take on risk in order to open a new market or make a significant
technological advance, because the individual credit they obtain from a new capability with a
significant impact (if it is successfully built) outweighs the personal consequences for failure.
In other words, if the manager does not entirely internalize the cost of a failed investment,
he may be more likely to invest in risky projects than is optimal. Thus, managers may have
an objective in use of expected return.
4.5.2 Risk and Return Correlation
Capital investments by an organization typically involve some risk; IT investments typically
involve even higher levels of risk than other non-IT capital investments (Dewan et al., 2007).
IT projects are commonly delayed or cancelled, go over budget, or are sharply reduced in
scope; up to a quarter of projects are often cancelled, and and a further half are completed
late or over budget (El Emam and Koru, 2008; Jones, 1998; Sonnekus and Labuschagne,
2004; Sauer and Cuthbertson, 2003). Risk for certain classes of complex IT investments
such as Enterprise Resource Planning systems are even higher (Hitt et al., 2002). In spite
of this, the Information Systems literature has not closely engaged with the high risk of IT
projects, or the risk/return tradeoff in IT investments (Tanriverdi and Ruefli, 2004; Dewan
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et al., 2007). Indeed, the high (and sometimes disproportional) return on IT investments
can be at least partially explained by the higher risks involved in IT projects (Dewan and
Ren, 2007).
Given the high levels of IT risk (as shown by project failures, etc.), any empirical analysis
must operationalize risk in a way that can be easily measured. The risk in a project can
be understood as the variability it induces in firm returns; the lower the variation (in other
words, the more certain the outcome), the lower the risk. If returns to an IT investment are
measured by its impact on the realized earnings of the firm (over multiple years, possibly
discounted to a present value), then the most natural variability measure would be the
standard deviation of these earnings. The standard deviation is perhaps the most widespread
measure of returns in accounting and finance, as well as being commonly used to measure
risk from IT investments (Kothari et al., 2002; Dewan et al., 2007; Hu et al., 2011).
Having given an operational definition of risk, one can attempt to understand how it is
correlated with returns. The conventional wisdom, from finance and economics, is that risk
and return are always positively correlated (e.g. Brealey and Myers (1981)). Conrad and
Plotkin (1968) show a significant positive correlation betwen risk and return, as do Fisher
and Hall (1969), both at the firm and industry level. Cootner and Holland (1970) add the
dimension of time, and again show a significant positive association at both the firm and
industry level. Hurdle (1974) also found a positive correlation at the firm and industry
level. The preceding studies all examined US firms; Neumann et al. (1979) found a similar
effect among West German firms, though when they split their sample into big and small
companies, a negative association emerged.
Bowman (1980) was the first to identify a potentially negative relationship in the strate-
gic management context; he found a significant negative association between risk and return
within industries, and a negative but not significant correlation across industries. Treacy
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(1980) found a negative and significant association both within and across industries. Bow-
man (1982) also found negative correlation specifically for troubled companies, and argued
that this may be due to such firms taking greater risks, even when the expected returns do
not justify them. Studying the effect of time, (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1985, 1986) found
significant correlations with opposite signs in the 1960s and 1970s. In a considerably larger
study involving more firms, Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) obtained results corroborating
Bowman’s earlier work, showing that firms with above-average performance had a positive
correlation between risk and return, while those with poor performance had a negative core-
lation. McNamara and Bromiley (1999) show that risk-return associations depend on the
measures which are used, but using a return measure which accounts for the expected costs
of risky decisions, a negative relationship emerges.
As IT projects tend to consistently involve higher risks than other forms of capital in-
vestment (Dewan et al., 2007; Kobelsky et al., 2008; Hitt et al., 2002), effective Information
Systems planning processes must account for such project risk, and consider both potential
risk and return when making IT investment decisions (Tanriverdi and Ruefli, 2004). Thus,
different attitudes towards risk or tolerance of risk are likely to result in different plans, and
IS planning outcomes are clearly affected by the risk and return expected by the organization.
While intuition might suggest a positive correlation between risk and return, the discussion
above suggests that the extent of this correlation is hard to quantify, and indeed, the cor-
relation may be negative. Unsurprisingly, as this correlation varies, IS planning strategies
that account for risk differently or exhibit varying levels of risk-averseness may be impacted
differently. We argue below that the benefit from double-loop learning may depend on the
correlation between risk and return, and hence, in order to draw meaningful conclusions
about this benefit, we must examine the benefit across a range of different correlations.
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4.5.3 Hypotheses
We first consider the question of how the benefit from double-loop learning is affected by the
correlation between IT investment risk and return. In this context, we measure the benefit
from double-loop learning in terms of the difference in IT plan effectiveness. First, consider
an organization with the strategic orientation of a Defender. As Defenders are typically
risk-averse (Delery and Doty, 1996), their espoused objective may be to maximize a risk-
adjusted expected return. However, suppose the organization uses expected return as their
objective in use. If risk and return are negatively correlated, as posited by some of the prior
work (Bowman, 1980, 1982; Treacy, 1980; Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1986, 1988; McNamara
and Bromiley, 1999), then projects with high expected return are likely to have low risk.
Thus, the objective in use will typically pick low-risk projects; this does not conflict with
their espoused objective and risk-averse orientation, and hence, changing their objective in
use to the espoused objective is unlikely to provide them with significant benefit. On the
other hand, if the risk and return are positively correlated, as suggested by the finance and
economics literature, or some prior work in strategic management (Conrad and Plotkin, 1968;
Fisher and Hall, 1969; Cootner and Holland, 1970), then projects of high expected return are
also likely to have high risk. Thus, the objective in use will typically pick high-risk projects,
which inherently conflicts with the espoused objective and risk-averse orientation. In this
setting, double-loop learning which modifies the objective in use and brings it in line with
the espoused objective is likely to provide significant benefit. Figure 4.2 below provides a
visual representation of this idea:
A similar argument applies for Prospectors, though their attitudes towards risk are dif-
ferent. Prospectors are typically not risk-averse; they are willing to take on additional risks
if these provide greater returns (Sabherwal and Chan, 2001). Thus, their espoused objective
is typically expected return, without a further discount for risk. However, suppose the or-
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Figure 4.2: Benefit from Double Loop Learning for Defenders
ganization uses a risk-adjusted expected return as their objective in use. If risk and return
are negatively correlated, then low-risk projects will typically have high return. Thus, an
objective in use that avoids risk will typically pick high-return projects. Since this does
not conflict with their espoused objective of expected return, changing from their objec-
tive in use to the espoused objective will not increase their IT plan effectiveness. On the
other hand, if the risk and return are positively correlated, then projects of low risk are also
likely to produce low returns. Thus, the objective in use (which avoids risk) will typically
pick low-return projects, conflicting with the espoused objective that attempts to maximize
return. In this scenario, if the organization engages in double-loop learning and modifies
the objective in use to bring it in line with the espoused objective, it is likely to result in
increased IT plan effectiveness. Figure 4.3 below summarizes this argument in a diagram.
Hypothesis 4.1. As the correlation between IT investment risk and return increases, the
additional plan effectiveness from Double-loop learning will increase for both Defenders and
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Figure 4.3: Benefit from Double Loop Learning for Prospectors
Prospectors.
We are also interested in understanding which kinds of firms benefit most from double-
loop learning. Again, we measure the benefit from double-loop learning in terms of IT plan
effectiveness. In terms of strategic orientation, we argue below that organizations with the
Defender profile may obtain increased benefit from double-loop learning than organizations
with the Prospector profile. Defenders operate in stable environments, with relatively well-
defined products and markets, and make low-risk investments (Hambrick, 1982) . They face
relatively low degrees of uncertainty, and can focus on effective plan implementation. If
an organization with this profile makes IT planning decisions and chooses a goal based on
an objective in use that is different from its espoused objective, they are likely to achieve
suboptimal results. Double-loop learning which can help them pick a goal based on their
true or espoused objective is likely to result in more effective planning outcomes.
Prospectors, on the other hand, operate in constantly changing markets, develop new
products, and make investments with unpredictable costs and risks (Miles et al., 1978). They
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face high degrees of uncertainty, and as a consequence, frequently change goals in response to
changing internal and external environments. As a result, regardless of which objective they
initially use to choose a goal, circumstances may force them to move in a different direction
and adopt a new goal. Veliyath and Shortell (1993) argue that in every planning cycle, novel
implementations may be adopted. Thus, double-loop learning that helps the organization
choose a goal in line with their espoused objective may provide limited benefits, since this
goal may have to be modified in the next planning cycle. Therefore, Prospectors are likely
to see lower benefits from double-loop learning than Defenders.
Hypothesis 4.2. The benefits of double-loop learning are greater for Defenders than Prospec-
tors.
4.6 Computational Study Methodology
4.6.1 Basic Features
We use the broad simulation framework described in Chapter 2, which we briefly review here.
At the beginning of the simulation, the organization has none of the capabilities it may wish
to build. Each potential capability is built by investing in at least one, but possibly more
projects. Again, we assume that time is divided into discrete units, and a single project can
be built in each unit.
As before, we use IT project data from a Fortune 50 company to build a distribution of
estimated project costs; we fit an exponential distribution with mean 4 to the project costs in
millions of dollars. (See Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3 for more details.) For use in our simulations,
we generate base costs for each project by repeated random draws from this distribution,
and to generate the estimated cost from a project from a given state, we multiply the base
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cost for this project with a state / transition-specific multiplier. We also generate a value
for each capability based on random draws from an exponential distribution. It is important
to note that no value is generated from a capability that is partially built or in the process
of being built. Finally, both costs and values are subject to uncertainty, which we represent
as a real number between 0, corresponding to perfect certainty / knowledge of the future,
and 1, corresponding to complete uncertainty where current estimates have essentially no
predictive value for the future.
We also deal with the risk of project failure, which we simulate by generating random
draws from a normal distribution, using distributions with different means for organizations
which are prospectors and defenders. If a project succeeds, the organization moves to a
new state, while if it fails, the organization remains in the same state; failed projects can
be re-attempted. Section 3.7 provides a comprehensive description of the overall simulation
framework and justification for the various assumptions presented above.
We have not yet discussed the objective of the organization, which is to be used in the
simulation when measuring the value of any plan or outcome. This is because the main
focus of the study is the fact that organizations may ‘change’ their objectives, or use an
objective not in line with their strategic orientation. That is, the objective in use may be
different from the espoused objective of the organization. We elaborate on this in the next
sub-section.
4.6.2 Prospectors and Defenders
We use the Miles and Snow (1978) typology to classify organizations as either Prospectors or
Defenders. Recall that Prospectors operate in dynamic, high-uncertainty environments, and
must frequently deal with changing circumstances. It is expected that IT investments will
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frequently fail, but Prospectors do not seek to eliminate this risk. Instead, they should be
willing to take on risk if it results in increased expected return. Thus, the espoused objective
for a Prospector is simply expected return.
However, IT leaders at a Prospector may not use their espoused objective when making
planning decisions. It is human nature to be risk-averse, and managers are not immune to
this tendency. Managers may wish to avoid being associated with risky projects that have
a high likelihood of failure, as they may perceive such failures as negatively impacting their
careers. Thus, though they may pay attention to the expected returns from IT projects,
these returns may be discounted by perceived risk. In other words, managers may have an
objective in use of risk-adjusted expected return.
Defenders, on the other hand, operate in relatively stable environments, with low uncer-
tainty. Defenders rarely make major technological changes and usually operate in narrow
and stable markets (Delery and Doty, 1996; Sabherwal and Chan, 2001). They focus on
operational efficiency and hence prefer to avoid risky projects with a high chance of failure;
rather, they invest in frequent incremental improvements each of which is likely to suc-
ceed. Therefore, Defenders are more risk-averse compared to Prospectors. Typically, their
espoused objective is risk-adjusted expected return.
While making planning decisions, IT leaders may not use this espoused objective. Man-
agers may be willing to take on risk in order to open a new market or make a significant
technological advance, because the individual credit they obtain from a new capability with a
significant impact (if it is successfully built) outweighs the personal consequences for failure.
In other words, if the manager does not entirely internalize the cost of a failed investment,
he may be more likely to invest in risky projects than is optimal. Thus, managers may have
an objective in use of expected return.
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In our simulation framework, we measure risk using the standard deviation of expected
returns. This is a well-studied and widely accepted model of risk (e.g. Hu et al., 2011;
Dewan et al., 2007). We then define risk-adjusted expected return as follows:
Risk-adjusted expected return = expected return− risk
In the computational model, when evaluating the consequence of investing in any project,
we consider the possible outcomes, each of which has an associated probability and an
associated expected return. To determine the overall expected return of this action, we
simply take the expectation over the returns of the outcomes. To determine the risk-adjusted
expected return of an action, we also compute the standard deviation of the returns of the
outcomes, and subtract it from the expected return.
Finally, when a plan is complete, we must evaluate it according to the espoused objective
of the organization. Measuring the return of a plan is straightforward: Simply compute the
values of the capabilities built, and subtract the cost incurred in IT investments. However,
measuring the risk-adjusted expected return of plans is more complex; to do this, when a
project fails, we impose an additional penalty to capture this risk effect. In expectation, this
gives us the desired risk-adjusted expected return.
More precisely, consider a project with failure probability r, and with a return of V if it
succeeds, and 0 if it fails. The standard deviation of the expected return is V ×√r × (1− r).
When the project fails, we impose a penalty of V ×√(1− r)/r. What is the expected penalty
that results? If the project succeeds (which occurs with probability 1−r), there is no penalty.
On the other hand, if the project fails (which occurs with probability r), we impose a penalty
of V ×√(1− r)/r. Thus, the average penalty is V × r ×√(1− r)/r = V ×√r × (1− r),
which is exactly the standard deviation of the return.
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4.6.3 Generating Correlated Risk and Returns
As discussed above, we hypothesize that the benefit from double-loop learning is affected
by the correlation between IT investment risk and return. When these are highly correlated
(that is, when projects of high return are also likely to involve higher risks), we expect there
to be more benefit from double-loop learning. On the other hand, when these are weakly, or
even negatively, correlated, we expect there to be a lower benefit from double-loop learning.
To test this hypothesis, it is necessary for us to generate random project data with different
levels of correlation between risk and return.
Recall from the previous chapter that we assume project failure probabilities are normally
distributed for both Prospectors and Defenders. However, the mean and standard deviation
of these distributions are higher for Prospectors than for Defenders. Typically, we assume
that failure probabilities for Prospectors are normally distributed with mean close to 0.2 and
standard deviation close to 0.07, while the distribution for Defenders has mean close to 0.08
and standard deviation close to 0.03.
On the other hand, capability value / returns are exponentially distributed, as described
above. Therefore, we must generate pairs of random variables, one from a specified normal
distribution, and the other from a specified exponential distribution, with a desired corre-
lation. We note that natural ways to generate correlated random variables may violate the
property that they have the desired marginal distributions. For example, suppose we wished
to generate two uniformly distributed random variables u1 and u2 in the range [0, 1] with
a correlation of 0.5. It is easy to generate independent uniform random variables in this
range, but this would not ensure the desired correlation. To produce correlation, we could
independently generate u1, and an additional uniformly distributed random variable z. We
could then set u2 = 0.5 ∗ u1 + 0.5 ∗ z. It is easy to see that u2 is in the desired range [0, 1],
and further, that u1 and u2 have the desired correlation. However, u2 is no longer uniformly
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of u2
distributed. Figure 4.4 below illustrates the distribution of u2.
It is relatively straightforward to generate two correlated normal random variables, but
for our computation, we wish to generate one normal and one exponential random variable.
We accomplish this by first generating two normal variables n1 and n2 with the desired
correlation. We use the first, n1, for the risk. To determine the return / value, we then
compute the quantile q = CDF (n2), where CDF is the cumulative distribution function
for the given normal distribution. We then generate a value v = Quant(q), where Quant
denotes the quantile or inverse cumulative distribution function for the desired exponential
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Figure 4.5: The empirical correlation between the variables n1 and v, as a function of the
desired correlation.
distribution. We now have a normally distributed random variable n1 and an exponentially
distributed random variable v. Though this method does not perfectly preserve correlations,
the correlation of n1 and v are very close to the initial specified correlations, and for our
purposes, the relative values of correlations are more significant than their absolute values.
Figure 4.5 below shows the correlation of n1 and v as a function of the initial specified
correlations.
Note that the blue circles (each dot representing the empirical correlation between 1000
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randomly generated values of the risk and return) very closely follow the black line (which
indicates a perfect match between the empirical and desired correlation). This suggests our
method of generating risk and return with the desired correlation is successful.
4.6.4 Measuring the Effect of Double-Loop Learning
As described above, we test the effect of Double Loop Learning by measuring its impact
on plan effectiveness. For Prospectors, the effectiveness of a plan is defined by its expected
return, while for Defenders, the effectiveness of a plan is its risk-adjusted expected return.
We assume that the planning algorithm always uses one of two objectives: expected return,
or risk-adjusted expected return, and makes planning decisions / chooses projects based on
this objective; however, this objective may not be the espoused objective of the organization.
In all our simulations, we consider the benefit of performing double-loop learning at different
time steps; we assume that if the organization’s objective in use is different from its espoused
objective at the time it performs double-loop learning, it will change its objective in use to
be aligned with its espoused objective for the rest of the simulation.
An organization that is an immediate learner is one which changes the objective in use
to be the same as the espoused objective at the beginning of the simulation, in contrast
to a non-learner, which never changes its objective in use. On the continuum between
these two extremes are sophisticated learners, which perform double-loop learning to change
the objective in use to align with the espoused objective relatively early in the simulation
(perhaps after just a few time steps), and naive learners, which correspond to organizations
that perform double-loop learning relatively late in the simulation (perhaps just a few time
steps before the end of the simulation).
A single run of our simulation begins with a fixed value r of the risk-return correlation,
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a fixed planning horizon h, and a time of double-loop learning LT . The organization may
be either a Prospector or Defender. As discussed above, sophisticated learners have a low
value of LT , while naive or non-learners have a high value of LT . We generate a set of
potential projects / capabilities, along with their associated risks and returns at the specified
correlation r. Now, in the start state, the organization considers all actions and possible
outcomes up to h time steps ahead, determines the value of every outcome (comparing
returns and costs along the relevant paths), and chooses an action / a project investment
that will maximize its objective in use. The organization then makes this investment, and
depending on whether it succeeds or fails, either moves to a new state or remains in the same
state. This process continues until time LT , at which point the organization performs double-
loop learning, and changes its objective in use to be the same as its espoused objective. From
this state, it again considers all possible actions and outcomes up to h time steps ahead, but
now, it chooses a project / makes an investment based on maximizing its espoused objective.
This process continues with the organization using its espoused objective until the end of the
simulation period. When the simulation terminates, the effectiveness of the plan is measured
in terms of the organization’s espoused objective.
To determine the benefit from double-loop learning, we repeat the simulation for every
value of LT between 0 and the length of the simulation. We compare the plan effectiveness
from the non-learner, which does not perform double-loop learning, to the immediate learner,
which performs double-loop learning at the beginning of the simulation. The difference be-
tween these is the benefit from double-loop learning. (One can also compare a sophisticated
learner to a naive learner.) Having computed this benefit, to ensure robustness of our results,
we repeat the simulation a large number n of times for each value of LT . For consistency,
every value of LT is compared on exactly the same n inputs, with the same costs, risks /
failure probabilities, returns, etc.
The description above for a set of simulation runs specifies the strategy profile of the
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organization (Prospector or Defender), and a value for the risk/return correlation r. To
test Hypothesis 4.1, we first consider Prospectors, and repeat this entire set of n runs with
different values of r; for each value, we measure the average benefit from double-loop learning.
We then repeat this for Defenders, measuring the average benefit from double-loop learning
for different values of r. To test Hypothesis 4.2, for each value of r, we compare the average
benefit from double-loop learning for the Defenders to the average benefit from double-loop
learning for the Prospectors. Our results are described in the next section.
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4.7 Results
Inputs to the Simulation Range Example Example
Prospector Defender
Number of Projects Upto 20* 11-14
Number of Capabilities ≤ No of Projects 4-6
Plan Length No Limit 8-14
Mean of Project failure Probability 0.0 - 1.0 0.25 0.08
(normal distribution)
Std. Dev of Project Failure Probability 0.0 - 1.0 0.1 0.03
(normal distribution)
Uncertainty in Costs 0.0 - 1.0 0.5 0.1
Uncertainty in Value 0.0 - 1.0 0.4 0.05
Mean of Cost >0 4
(exponential distribution)
Mean of Capability Value >0 5.5
(exponential distribution)
Correlation -1.0 – 1.0 0.25 0.6
Number of Runs No limit 100
Table 4.1: Example / Typical Inputs to the Simulation
In this section, we describe the results of our computational study, which provide support
to the hypotheses we have developed. Before presenting the outputs of our study, we first
describes its inputs in Table 4.1, along with typical values for a Prospector strategy profile
and Defender strategy profile. These values are merely typical examples to provide an
understanding of the inputs used in our study; our computational experiments used multiple
values for each input. Note that in our study, Prospectors and Defenders differ primarily in
the level of risk in projects they consider undertaking (represented by the failure probability),
and the levels of uncertainty they face in project costs and values derived from successfully
implemented capabilities. For each simulation, we present the inputs in a table, with an
associated graph representing the benefit from double-loop learning at different learning
times LT .
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Number of Projects 12
Number of Capabilities 5
Plan Length 10
Mean of Project Failure Probability 0.24
Std. Dev of Project Failure Probability 0.1
Uncertainty in Costs 0.4
Uncertainty in Value 0.4
Mean of Costs 4
Mean of Capability Value 5.5
Correlation 0.95
Number of Runs 100
Table 4.2: Simulation Input 1 - Prospectors
Figure 4.6: Prospector - Benefit from Double Loop Learning
From our first simulation, we observe that Prospectors which immediately learn and
correct their objective obtain significantly higher net value from planning than those which
do not learn; this demonstrates the benefit from double-loop learning.
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Number of Projects 13
Number of Capabilities 5
Plan Length 12
Mean of Project Failure Probability 0.09
Std. Dev of Project Failure Probability 0.035
Uncertainty in Costs 0.05
Uncertainty in Value 0.08
Mean of Costs 4
Mean of Capability Value 5.3
Correlation 0.7
Number of Runs 100
Table 4.3: Simulation Input 2 - Defender
Similarly, our next simulation demonstrates that organizations with the Defender profile
which learn and hence modify their objective in use to align with their espoused objective
(that is, perform double-loop learning) obtain better planning outcomes (in terms of net
value). Again, this demonstrates the benefit of double-loop learning.
Figure 4.7: Defender - Benefit from Double Loop Learning
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Number of Projects 12
Number of Capabilities 5
Plan Length 10
Mean of Project Failure Probability 0.11
Std. Dev of Project Failure Probability 0.04
Uncertainty in Costs 0.1
Uncertainty in Value 0.1
Mean of Costs 4
Mean of Capability Value 5.5
Number of Runs 200





Table 4.5: Defender - Benefits from Learning at different risk-return correlations
Figure 4.8: Defenders with different risk-return correlations
Figures 4.8 and 4.9, together with the accompanying tables demonstrating the benefit
from double-loop learning at different correlations of IT project risks and returns, strongly
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Number of Projects 11
Number of Capabilities 4
Plan Length 9
Mean of Project Failure Probability 0.24
Std. Dev of Project Failure Probability 0.1
Uncertainty in Costs 0.4
Uncertainty in Value 0.2
Mean of Costs 4
Mean of Capability Value 5.5
Number of Runs 100
Table 4.6: Simulation Input 4 - Prospector with different risk-return correlations
Figure 4.9: Prospectors with different risk-return correlations
support Hypothesis 4.1, that the benefit from double-loop learning increases with the risk-
return correlation.
To examine Hypothesis 4.2, we run experiments with identical input parameters (number
of projects, capabilities, costs, values, etc.), except for those factors that differ between






Table 4.7: Prospector - Benefits from Learning at different risk-return correlations
Number of Projects 11
Number of Capabilities 4
Plan Length 9
Mean of Costs 4
Mean of Capability Value 5.5
Number of Runs 100
Table 4.8: Common Inputs for Simulation 6 - Prospectors and Defenders
Figure 4.10: Benefit from double-loop learning for Defenders vs. Prospectors
Finally, to demonstrate the robustness of our computational methodology, we vary the
degree of risk aversion used when calculating a risk-adjusted expected return. The lower the
degree of risk aversion, the closer the two objectives of expected return and risk-adjusted
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Prospector Defender
Mean of Project Failure Probability 0.24 0.1
Std. Dev of Project Failure Probability 0.1 0.03
Uncertainty in Costs 0.4 0.1
Uncertainty in Value 0.2 0.08
Table 4.9: Different Inputs for Simulation 6 - Prospectors and Defenders
Number of Projects 11
Number of Capabilities 4
Plan Length 9
Mean of Project Failure Probability 0.24
Std. Dev of Project Failure Probability 0.1
Uncertainty in Costs 0.4
Uncertainty in Value 0.2
Mean of Costs 4
Mean of Capability Value 5
Number of Runs 100
Table 4.10: Simulation Inputs 6 - Varying risk aversion
expected return. When these two objectives are more closely aligned, we expect a smaller
benefit from switching between the two objectives due to double-loop learning. That is, the
lower the degree of risk aversion, the lower the expected benefit from double-loop learning.
To demonstrate this, we run our experiments with normal, higher and lower extent of risk
aversion. Since we measure risk as the standard deviation of return, the risk adjustments
we apply are 1.0 times the standard deviation of return (normal risk-aversion), 1.3 times
the standard deviation (higher risk-aversion), and 0.8 times the standard deviation (lower
risk-aversion). As expected, Figure 4.11 shows that there is more benefit from double-loop
learning when the degree of risk aversion is higher; this validates our computational study.
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Figure 4.11: Varying Risk Aversion
Multiplier for standard deviation Benefit
0.8 (low-risk-aversion) 12.07%
1.0 (normal-with-risk aversion) 72.14%
1.3 (high risk aversion) 140.80%
Table 4.11: Benefits from Learning at different levels of risk aversion
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4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we considered how IS planning systems may incorporate learning, and hence
may change and improve over time. Considerable prior theory suggests that organizations
which include learning in their planning process improve both their planning systems and
planning outcomes. Based on real IS project data from a leading Fortune 50 company, we
demonstrate that such learning can occur in practice, and organizations can draw useful
inferences that can benefit their planning.
We study double-loop learning (Argyris 1976), which allows organizations to change even
their fundamental objectives, and we apply this to the Information Systems planning context.
Drawing on the organizational strategy typology of Miles and Snow (1978), and agency
theory (Berle and Means, 1932) , we show how the risk appetite that managers demonstrate
in real planning decisions may not align with the organization’s strategy profile. That is,
organizations of the Prospector type may be inappropriately risk-averse in practice, and on
the other hand, organizations of the Defender type may be risk-tolerant or risk-seeking. This
discrepancy may lead to inappropriate planning decisions, and hence sub-optimal planning
outcomes. Double-loop learning can ensure that the organization’s objective in use matches
their espoused objective, and hence improve the effectiveness of the planning system.
Refining these ideas further, we argued that the benefit from double-loop learning may
vary by organizational strategy profile, with Prospectors, who operate in environments of
high uncertainty, typically receiving less benefit from double-loop learning than Defenders.
Further, we argued that the benefit from double-loop learning may be strongly affected by
the level of correlation between projects risks and returns: When these are highly (positively)
correlated, the tension between these two factors may lead to inappropriate decisions if the
organization’s objective in use differs from its espoused objective. In contrast, when these
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are weakly or negatively correlated, the tension between these factors is reduced, and hence
the loss from using an inappropriate objective is lower. In other words, the benefit from
double-loop learning is higher when the correlation between IT project risks and returns is
higher. We examined these hypotheses using a computational study, and our results validate
both hypotheses.
It would be interesting to extend this study in several ways in future research: One
possibility is to examine the role of risk in IT planning decisions across a large number of
organizations with different strategy profiles, and verify that when decision rules used by
managers do not match the espoused risk appetite of the organization, such practices are
likely to change. A recent contribution in this area is by Karhade et al. (2014), which
examines the planning decisions of two units of a large Fortune 50 firm. Another interesting
approach would be to compare the performance of companies with their use of double-loop






In this thesis, we considered the Information Systems planning process, and factors that can
make IS planning more effective. As we discussed, Information Systems planning involves
correctly determining an appropriate IT goal for the organization (the ‘ends’ of the plan)
and finding an efficient method to achieve this goal (the ‘means’ of the plan). We make
contributions along both of these dimensions, which have been widely recognized as crucial
in making high-quality and effective IS plans (Premkumar and King, 1994).
Our first contribution, along the ‘ends’ dimension, was in identifying the importance
of rarity of IT resources in strategic planning. We showed that for many categories of IT
resources, the possession of rare technologies in these categories influenced alliance formation,
and subsequent firm performance. We also examined the effect of rare technologies on the
types of alliances formed (joint ventures vs. arm’s length alliances). Based on strong theory
and empirical evidence from a rich and extensive dataset, we conclude that firms may wish
to consider the rarity of IT capabilities when making strategic IS plans, as this can influence
both alliances and firm returns.
We next focused on building a formal model of the Information Systems planning process.
Using the framework of Markov Decision Processes, we developed a model that captures
120
many important features of IS planning, including uncertain estimates of costs and returns,
risks related to project failures, multiple dimensions of costs, etc. This allowed us to perform
detailed computational studies, investigating the effects of different planning choices across
multiple dimensions, and evaluating their impacts on plan outcomes. These highlights the
importance of finding effective “means” to achieve organizational goals.
The first primary dimension we examined was the length of an organization’s IT planning
horizon. We considered how firms with different strategic profiles may benefit from horizons
of different lengths. In particular, using the typology of Miles and Snow (1978), we demon-
strated that organizations with the Defender profile, facing low uncertainty and investing in
low-risk projects tend to gain most from long planning horizons. In constrast, organizations
with the Prospector profile, which invest in risky projects and face considerable uncertainty,
tend to benefit more from shorter planning horizons.
The second major dimension we considered was organizational learning. We defined
learning as inference, followed by action to improve effectiveness. Based on exhaustive IT
project data from a business unit of a leading Fortune 50 company, we showed that organiza-
tions can usefully engage in inductive learning, and hence improve project performance. Our
main focus in this chapter was on double-loop learning, and we make two important contri-
butions: First, we extend it to the area of IS planning, and second, our computational study
provides one of the first empirical demonstrations of the benefit from double-loop learning;
previous work in this area has been primarily theoretical. We argued that firms when making
IS planning decisions, firms may use an objective that differs from their espoused objective;
organizations which perform double-loop learning and address this discrepancy will produce
more effective plans. In particular, organizations may make decisions using a risk tolerance
that is different from their espoused tolerance, and hence may adopt an inappropriate level
of risk. We show that the benefit from double-loop learning increases with the correlation
between risk and return. We also showed that organizations with a Defender profile obtain
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more benefit from such learning than organizations with a Prospector profile.
5.2 Future Work
Though we have made significant strides in understanding factors which influence the IS
planning process and its outcomes, much remains to be done in this area, and there are
many fruitful avenues for further research. We list some of the most promising directions
below:
We showed that organizations possessing rare IT resources tend to form more alliances,
which suggests that (at least some) firms tend to consider the rarity of a potential partner’s
resources when deciding whether to form an alliance. It would be interesting to establish
how widespread and / or explicit this behavior is; one way to examine this could be via a
survey of leading IS executives. Further, one could determine whether firms which explicitly
consider the benefits they may get from forming an alliance with a partner possessing rare
resources subsequently perform better. In what situations do firms choose alliances over
acquisitions in order to gain rare technological resources?
As described above, we developed a powerful computational framework that can form a
detailed model of the IS planning process. We examined two significant planning dimensions,
but this framework can be extended to study many other such dimensions of IS planning,
and to examine their impact on plan effectiveness. Some important process dimensions to
consider include comprehensiveness and adaptability.
For many of the process dimensions of Information Systems Planning, the benefit of
making different choices can vary from one type of organization to another. In our work, we
focused on the strategy profile of Miles and Snow (1978) (Prospectors and Defenders), but
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others can be considered. Identifying additional organizational profiles could be interesting
both from a research and managerial perspective, to give guidance to senior IT leaders.
Finally, we considered double-loop learning to detect and correct differences between an
organization’s espoused objective and objective in use based on risk appetite. There may
be other factors causing a gap between the two objectives, and this is a natural direction
for future work. Survey-based research to determine the discrepancy between objectives
and practice espoused and used by an organization (and whether they attempt double-loop
learning to eliminate this gap) can be very useful in this regard.
More generally, in the age of Big Data, organizations have ever-increasing quantities of
information that can be used as a basis for learning. Trends and patterns can be identified,
leading to the rise of pattern-directed strategies. More concretely, along the lines of our
research, firms can mine their data to find which managers or organizational units use
decision rules for IS planning that lead to an inappropriate level of risk. Across multiple firms,
researchers can determine which organizational patterns and strategies are most effective,
leading to increased innovation, performance, and sustained advantage.
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